Environmental Uncertainty,Corporate Anti-Takeover Intensity And Management Myopia | | Posted on:2024-05-10 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | | Country:China | Candidate:J Y Chen | Full Text:PDF | | GTID:2569307052988259 | Subject:Accounting | | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | | Management myopia is an important issue in the study of corporate governance.Management myopia refers to the fact that due to the conflict of interest with share holders of listed companies,the concern about their own career,the threat of mergers and acquisitions in the capital market and the performance of the stock market,the management tends to choose investment projects with shorter term and lower risk in order to maximize the short-term financial performance or stock price performance.While sacrificing the long-term interests of the company,resulting in the lack of investment in research and development,innovation and other long-term intangible assets projects.The existing literature shows that the existence of this problem is influenced by both the privacy of the financial management environment and the internal governance factors.Based on the realistic background that our country is in the critical period of upgrading and transformation,and enterprises with fierce international competition are facing great environmental uncertainty,this paper also considers the internal governance changes of many listed companies in recent years to set anti-takeover clauses in their bylaws,and studies whether and how the environmental uncertainty affects the company’s management short-termism.And it further tests the influence of the anti-takeover clause on the relationship between them.In this paper,the principal-agent theory,management defense hypothesis,information asymmetry theory,control market theory and so on are analyzed theoretically.On this basis,the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2021 are selected as research samples to empirically test the proposed hypothesis.The empirical results show that:(1)the greater the degree of environmental uncertainty,the more likely to occur short-sighted management;(2)When the number of anti-takeover clauses in the articles of association is large,that is,the intensity of anti-takeover is relatively high,the positive impact of environmental uncertainty on the short-sightedness of the management is more significant.(3)The test of corporate heterogeneity shows that the positive effect of environmental uncertainty on management myopia is more significant in enterprises with low management ownership than in enterprises with high management ownership.Compared with enterprises with low financing constraints,the positive effect of environmental uncertainty on management myopia is more significant in enterprises with high financing constraints.The research of this paper is helpful to know and understand the deep-seated causes of the short-sightedness of the management and has reference significance for seeking ways to alleviate the short-sightedness of the management.The innovation of this paper lies in:(1)Fully consider the external environmental factors and changes in internal governance conditions faced by the company’s management,incorporate environmental uncertainty and corporate anti-takeover into the same research framework to study the short-sightedness of the management,to a certain extent expand the research on the influencing factors of management short-sightedness,and enrich the research literature on the economic effects of environmental uncertainty and the anti-takeover clause of the company’s articles of association;(2)Considering the characteristics of the management and the company’s financial characteristics,this paper studies the difference of the impact of environmental uncertainty on the short-sightedness of the management under different situational factors,and further explains the short-sightedness of the management. | | Keywords/Search Tags: | Environmental uncertainty, management myopia, anti-takeover intensity, management shareholding, financing constraints | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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