| China’s manufacturing industry is massive,but key core technologies are still poorly understood,and the country is generally at the middle and bottom of the global value chain.Innovation is the driving force behind enterprise development,and the executive team,as the company’s most valuable human resource,is intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of enterprise innovation strategies.The ability to effectively motivate executives to promote innovative development is critical for enterprises,and the frequent changes of executives and the increase or decrease of the size of the executive team in China’s listed companies affect the stability of the enterprise’s executive team,which in turn affects the enterprise’s innovation activities to some extent.Scholars are divided on whether executive excess salary can improve firms’ innovative performance,and more research is needed.At the same time,existing research on the moderating relationship between executive excess salary and innovation performance is primarily focused on firm risk-taking capacity,ignoring the fact that executive team stability also plays a moderating role in the relationship.As a result,this paper examines the effect of executive team stability as a moderating variable on the former two relationships,as well as the differences in the former two relationships under ownership concentration,equity nature,and regional heterogeneity.This study employs the literature review approach to first read and compile the pertinent literature,summarize areas where the literature leaves opportunity for future research in pertinent research topics,and determine the relevance of this work.Then,the manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China from 2013 to 2020 were chosen as the research samples,and data were collected from the CSMAR database and the CNRDS database.These theories included principal-agent theory,incentive theory,effective contract theory,career theory,and technological innovation theory.The original data was first cleaned and processed in Excel before being imported into Stata for statistical analysis.Regression analysis was then carried out in accordance with the research model to form and derive the empirical results,and specific analyses were made based on the results,such as the impact of executive excess salary on corporate innovation performance and whether there was a moderate relationship between the two.The findings were examined in terms of how executive excess salary affects innovation performance and whether executive team stability has a moderating effect on the relationship between the first two,and whether the executive team’s stability has a moderating effect on the relationship between the first two.The influence of CEO excess salary on innovation performance,the moderating role of executive team stability in the relationship between the first two,the executive equity concentration and the nature of equity,and regional heterogeneity were all included in the analysis of the data.The following conclusions are reached:(1)Executive excess salary can successfully foster corporate innovation performance and produce high-quality R&D patents;(2)Executive team stability can strengthen the promotion effect of executive excess salary on corporate innovation performance;(3)The promotion effect of executive excess salary on corporate innovation performance is more significant in firms with high executive equity concentration.(4)When compared to state-owned enterprises,the promotion effect of executive excess salary on corporate innovation performance is more significant in firms with high executive equity concentration;(5)When compared to central and western regions,the effect of executive excess salary on corporate innovation performance is more significant in eastern regions’ enterprises.This paper uses executive excess salary as a starting point to investigate corporate innovation,broadening the existing research perspective and making recommendations for the design of executive compensation contracts and incentive mechanisms for Chinese manufacturing firms. |