Research On The Impact Of Institutional Investors’ Shareholding On The Opportunistic Stock Selling Behaviors Of Executives

Under the principal-agent relationship,the executive damages the interests of the company.Although the state has explicitly prohibited insider trading,it is difficult to identify insider trading,especially whether the executives’ stock reduction in the secondary market contains opportunistic motives,so the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives is repeatedly prohibited.The institutional investors play the role of stabilizing the capital market,which can reduce the volatility of security market effectively.In 2001,CSRC put forward the “super conventional development of institutional investors”,which shows the importance of institutional investors to our capital market.Therefore,the key content of this paper is whether institutional investors can be introduced to strengthen the constraints on corporate executives,so as to alleviate the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.Therefore,this paper reviews the existing literature,and uses the principal-agent theory,the theory of information asymmetry and the theory of structural holes to analyze the connection between institutional investors’ shareholding and the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.According to the action path between the two,the degree of information asymmetry is intended to be the intermediary variable,and the research hypothesis of this paper is proposed and the corresponding model is built.In this paper,the event research method and empirical research method are used to select appropriate measurement methods,and the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2021 are used as research objects for empirical analysis.Through descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis,the empirical results are as follows:(1)The institutional investors’ shareholding is negatively correlated with the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives;(2)The degree of information asymmetry plays an intermediary role in the process of the influence of institutional investors’ shareholding on the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.The empirical results show that the institutional investors’ shareholding do play a significant positive role in restraining the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives,and institutional investors’ shareholding can reduce the degree of information asymmetry of companies through supervision and governance,so as to inhibit the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.In order to further explore the influence of heterogeneity on the relationship between the two,the empirical analysis is further carried out,and the empirical results are as follows:(1)Compared with state-owned enterprises,institutional investors’ shareholding in non-state-owned enterprises are more able to restrain the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives;(2)The lower the degree of marketization of the region where the enterprise is located,the stronger the institutional investors’ shareholding inhibition of the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.Therefore,the non-state-owned enterprises in the company and the enterprises in the regions with a low degree of marketization will have a better effect by introducing institutional investors’ shareholding.Therefore,this paper puts forward the following suggestions from the perspective of the company and the government to alleviate the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives in the company.The suggestions for the company level are as follows: improve the investor relationship management system to attract institutional investors to invest;Give full play to the supervisory role of all staff and pay attention to the governance ability of shareholders;Improve the information disclosure system,improve the transparency of the company.At the government level,the suggestions are as follows: improve the relevant policies of institutional investors and vigorously develop institutional investors;Improve the supervision of management related policies,increase the punishment of senior executives opportunism;Increase the participation of the whole society in supervision and improve the transparency of capital market information;We will improve the supervision system for nonstate-owned enterprises and attach importance to the development of institutional investors in non-state-owned enterprises.We will improve laws and regulations in areas with a low degree of marketization and attach importance to the development of institutional investors with a low degree of marketization.The innovation points of this paper are as follows: First,the structural hole theory is introduced to analyze the behavior and economic consequences of institutional investors in the company from the position of the structural hole,which provides a new Angle for the study of institutional investors;Second,few scholars consider the restraining effect of institutional investors’ shareholding when studying the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.The introduction of institutional investors’ shareholding provides a new way to alleviate the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives in companies;Third,there are few literatures on the role path between institutional investors’ shareholding and the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives.This paper introduces the degree of information asymmetry as an intermediary variable to explain the relationship between institutional investors’ shareholding and the opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives from the perspective of information asymmetry,providing new evidence for the role path of institutional investors’ shareholding.