| Since our country formally popularized the stock right incentive system in 2006,the executive stock right incentive has gradually become the necessary means for the company to hire more high-level managers in the continuous development,executives are also increasingly considering whether and how strongly companies implement equity-based incentives.For executives,equity incentive is an effective means to improve their enthusiasm and motivation to gain personal benefits and realize personal value;for listed companies,equity incentive can relieve the pressure of principal-agent,make the interests of executives and shareholders tend to the same,so as to promote the company’s effective internal governance means.In 2018,the China Securities Regulatory Commission comprehensively revised the measures for the administration of equity incentives of listed companies,making them more stringent and flexible,it provides a strong support for the development of equity incentive in our country.In 2022,the value report on China’s entrepreneurs(2022),also known as the report on comprehensive research on executive compensation and corporate equity incentives in China’s listed companies,as our registration system advances and the domestic economy improves,the number of equity incentive plans has grown significantly,with the number of 2021 a-share market announcements increasing by 82.74 per cent compared with 2020.In addition,since 2006,the coverage of equity incentives has increased from 2.81%to 48.03%,and the depth of equity incentives has increased to 1.61%,to some extent,it shows that the equity incentive of our country has already entered the" Normalization" era.At present,there is no unified standard for audit pricing in our country.With the rapid increase in the number of audit Accounting networks and associations and even the emergence of price competition,the auditor needs to consider all kinds of internal and external factors as fully as possible when assessing the risk of the audited entity.And whether the implementation of executive equity incentive plan and the strengthening of the intensity of equity incentive will affect the audit scope of third-party auditors and the selection of audit procedures,so as to enable the audited company to pay the auditor more reasonable remuneration.Therefore,this paper not only discusses the impact of executive equity incentive as an internal governance factor on audit pricing,but also explores the role of internal characteristics and external environmental factors in the relationship between the two,this is of great significance to the further perfection of our stock right incentive system and the standardization of audit pricing standards.Based on the above considerations,this article first through the literature review,to find out the gaps in existing research,to find areas for further research,through the theoretical frameworks of principal-agent theory,signal transmission theory and risk-oriented audit theory,and taking into account the actual situation of our sample companies from 2012 to 2021,this 2021 analyzes the impact of executive equity incentives on audit pricing,the paper also analyzes the influence mechanism and heterogeneity of the relationship between the two,and studies the influence of internal control quality and marketization level on the relationship between the two from the company’s internal characteristics and external environment,in further analysis,distinguish between equity incentive models,and explore whether there are differences in the impact of Restricted stock and stock options on audit pricing,and the impact of the nature of property rights on the relationship between the two,the conclusions are as follows:(1)there is a significant negative correlation between executive equity incentive and audit pricing;(2)the quality of internal control plays an intermediary role in the impact of executive equity incentives on audit pricing(3)the level of marketization strengthens the impact of executive equity incentives on audit pricing,that is,the higher the degree of marketization,(4)comparing the Restricted stock incentive model and the stock option model,we found that the implementation of stock option model is more effective,(5)the property right nature of the listed company which implements the stock option system will not affect the audit pricing.The research conclusion of this paper has certain significance both in theory and in reality.Its theoretical significance lies in that this paper enriches the research on the influencing factors of audit pricing and refines the research on executive incentive,which is a supplement to the research on the economic consequences of executive equity incentive in external audit.It can be used as a reference for listed companies,Accounting networks and associations audit pricing and regulators such as the government.Firstly,the current research on executive equity incentive is mainly based on the overall level of contract,and this paper classifies executive equity incentive in further research,to explore whether there are differences in the impact of executive equity incentives on audit pricing under different contract elements,and secondly,the related researches on its mechanism are mostly from the perspective of intermediary effect,the regulatory mechanism is rarely explored from the perspective of heterogeneity.This paper introduces a moderating variable to analyze whether the external environmental factors have moderating effect,which extends the existing research perspective of the relationship between Executive Equity Incentive and audit pricing. |
