| It is very important to explore the influence of the state of operation on the connected transaction behavior of the listed companies under the background of strong supervision of the capital market and vigorous implementation of the registration system.Based on the dynamic perspective of the financial situation of listed companies,this thesis analyzes the connected transaction behavior,establishes the direct relationship between financial distress and connected transaction,and clarifies the regulating effect of corporate governance factors on connected transaction behavior under financial distress.It effectively explains the economic phenomenon of unannounced connected transactions by listed enterprises at the end of the year,helps investors and regulators to understand the transaction mechanism and transaction risk,promotes listed companies to reduce and avoid delisting and other special-purpose connected transactions,and constantly improves the ability of sustainable operation.In the previous studies,more attention has been paid to the influence of controlling shareholders on related party transactions,and insufficient attention has been paid to the operation of listed companies themselves.It is simply to describe the influence on related party transactions or the economic consequences of related party transactions from some static structural features(equity structure,nature of shareholders,identity of directors,nature of business,etc.),which greatly limits the explanation of related party transactions.Financial distress is a dynamic and abnormal state for listed companies.At this time,the listed companies are under double pressure of operation uncertainty and delisting risk,which seriously affects the operation objectives and trading motivation.From the perspective of financial distress,this thesis examines the direct impact of operation on connected transactions and its mechanism.The financial data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2003～2020 years were used as samples to verify the impact of financial distress on the frequency and scale of related party transactions.Research results show that when facing financial difficulties,listed companies have significantly increased connected transactions.Specifically,by comparing financial distress with non-financial distress companies,it is found that the related transactions of listed companies with financial distress are more significant.The reason is that listed enterprises will face stricter supervision once they get into financial difficulties,which will narrow the financing channels and make it more difficult for companies to get out of difficulties.In order to increase profits or revenues in the short term,they will choose the connected transaction mode for earnings management when the violation becomes heavy.Further research has found that internal governance mechanisms(internal control)and external governance mechanisms(analyst attention)have a significant inhibitory effect on related party transactions when listed companies face financial difficulties.The conclusion of this thesis theoretically explains the economic phenomenon of profit regulation by centralized trading of listed companies at the end of the year,and provides the literature support for the causes of related transactions.At the same time,the thesis suggests that regulators should pay attention to the influence of corporate governance on related party transactions in the financial distress,and promote listed companies to give full play to the role of internal governance factors,pay attention to the role of external information environment,so as to effectively restrain the regulation of profit evading related party transactions.This study is of reference significance to explore how to improve the quality of listed companies. |
