A Study On Governance Of Major Sharenholder Hollowing By Regulatory Inquiry

In the context of the continuous innovation of regulatory methods in the capital market,as an important first-line regulatory method of exchanges,the number of inquiry letters is increasing year by year,the Angle is becoming more professional,the questions are becoming more detailed,and it has gradually become an important issue that scholars pay close attention to.In recent years,the listed companies(especially the listed companies whose major shareholders are in financial crisis)have been hollowed out by major shareholders,which has seriously disturbed the order of the financial market.In the practice of inquiry letter regulation,the exchange provides incremental information for investors by issuing inquiry letters to listed companies suspected of being holed out by major shareholders and gets replies,which successfully inhibits the hollowing out behavior of major shareholders,indicating that regulatory inquiry has governance effect on the hollowing out of major shareholders.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the governance effect of regulatory inquiry on the hollowing out of major shareholders in the capital market and improve the mechanism of regulatory inquiry.This thesis reviews relevant literature on inquiry letter and major shareholder hollowing out,among which the research literature directly related to this thesis is that of Nie Ping(2018),whose empirical research based on large samples shows that inquiry letter regulation can effectively inhibit the hollowing out behavior of major shareholders.As there are few studies on the relationship between inquiry letter regulation and major shareholder hollowing out based on specific companies,Nanjing New Hundred has gradually attracted the attention of this thesis in the process of data collection and collation.Based on this,this thesis takes the capital appropriation of major shareholders and related transactions of Nanjing New Hundred as the research object.On the basis of sorting out the process of the incident,it analyzes the main ways of the holloway of major shareholders of Nanjing New Hundred,and studies the governance mechanism,restraining effect and economic consequences of the holloway of major shareholders caused by regulatory inquiries.At the same time,according to the results of case analysis,the inadequacy of the inquiry letter mechanism is discussed,which can provide some reference for the decision-making of policy making institutions,investors and listed companies.The case analysis shows that: On the one hand,in the process of reviewing publicly disclosed information of listed companies,regulators can identify the risk of major shareholder holloway in terms of capital occupation and connected transactions,raise questions through inquiry letters,release regulatory pressure,transmit public opinion pressure and play the synergistic role of intermediaries to urge listed companies to give up improper behaviors.On the other hand,for major shareholders’ possible hollowing behavior,regulatory inquiry is conducive to urging listed companies to improve internal control,improve audit institutions’ perception of risk and audit fees,so as to protect the interests of minority shareholders.