Research On Effects Of Vertical Interlocking Of Executives On Green Technology Innovation Of Listed Companies

In recent years,with the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization as well as the rapid progress of science and technology,the environmental pollution problem has become increasingly prominent,attracting extensive attention from the government and academia.To better promote high-quality economic development,the state advocates a green and low-carbon lifestyle and sets up a green living concept.From the past,economic growth at the cost of sacrificing the environment to a new win-win model that promotes ecological environment protection and economic development through green technology innovation.As the main body of green technology innovation,the business group have significant advantages over other types of enterprises due to the resource agglomeration of their internal capital markets.In addition,as the main participant in the enterprise’s strategic decision-making and daily operation,senior managers are bound to have an important impact on the green technology innovation of subsidiaries.In recent years,it has become more and more common for senior managers of listed companies to hold concurrent posts with major shareholders.The time and cost of information communication between major shareholders and listed companies have been significantly reduced through Vertical interlocks of executives,and the authenticity of information has been guaranteed,which will play an important role in the green technology innovation of subsidiaries.With the research of the existing literature,there is no consistent conclusion on the economic consequences of the Vertical interlocks of executives.On the one hand,it is believed that large shareholders send senior executives to listed companies to ease the information asymmetry between parent and subsidiary companies,thereby inhibiting the self-interest behavior of senior managers.On the other hand,it is believed that the large shareholders’ sending senior executives to the listed companies makes them act as the internal agents and tools for tunnelling the listed companies.Based on this,this paper explores the impact of Vertical interlocks of executives on green technology innovation of subsidiaries and its mechanism and clarifies the boundary conditions for its role.Based on the information asymmetry theory and the principal-agent theory,this paper conducts an empirical analysis of non-financial subsidiaries listed by Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share groups from 2007 to 2021 through manual collection and sorting.The main evidence of the article shows that:(1)Vertical interlocks of executives have a significant inhibitory effect on the green technology innovation of subsidiaries.(2)When the listed subsidiary is a non-state-owned enterprise,the role of Vertical interlocks of executives concurrently restraining the green technology innovation of the subsidiary is more significant.(3)The degree of Balance of equity negatively regulates the inhibitory effect of Vertical interlocks of executives on green technology innovation of subsidiaries,that is,the higher the degree of balance of equity,the weaker the inhibitory effect of Vertical interlocks of executives on green technology innovation of subsidiaries.(4)Environmental uncertainty negatively regulates the inhibition effect of Vertical interlocks of executives on green technology innovation of subsidiaries,that is,the higher the environmental uncertainty,the stronger the inhibition effect of Vertical interlocks of executives on green technology innovation of subsidiaries.(5)Through further analysis,it is found that the Vertical interlocks of executives further restrain the green technology innovation of subsidiaries by increasing the short-sighted behavior of large shareholders to make them invest in high-yield financial assets and enhance the tunnelling behavior of large shareholders.In addition,When the executive with the vertical interlocks is the chairman,the greater the inhibitory effect of the executive who concurrently holds the post of chairman on the green technology innovation of the subsidiary.The research conclusion of this paper is expected to provide help for the government and its regulatory authorities to formulate and improve the policy of Vertical interlocks of executives,and the formulation of corresponding punishment measures can deter the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders from the institutional level,thus giving play to the supervision and synergy of Vertical interlocks of executives.