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Research On The Game Influence Of Buyer Financing In Supply Chain Finance

Posted on:2023-07-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X P LiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306911495434Subject:Logistics engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
For the supply chain led by large retailers,upstream suppliers with capital constraints are often difficult to fulfill production contracts,which greatly hinders the retailer from seizing market profits and improving supply chain performance.Small and medium-sized suppliers often face financing difficulties due to limited credit investigation and operating conditions.As traditional financing institutions,banks lack direct knowledge of suppliers’ transaction conditions and product quality,and usually set higher interest rates to avoid their own risks,which makes it more difficult for small and medium-sized suppliers to survive.In recent years,the gradual development of supply chain finance and buyer financing has brought new cooperation channels for banks and provided new ideas for SME financing.Based on the information asymmetry caused by suppliers’ product defects,this paper considers a two-level supply chain composed of a upstream supplier with capital constraints and a downstream retailer.Based on the newsvendor model,a Stackelberg game model is established to study the supply chain decision-making under bank financing,prepayment and buyer guarantee financing.In this paper,the actual defect probability of supplier’s products and the prior probability of bank’s estimate of supplier have an impact on production and wholesale price.Buyer financing helps the bank improve the impact of information asymmetry on earnings.This paper analyzes the financing decisions of the supplier and the retailer under three financing methods,compares the performance of different financing methods in pairs,and discusses the financing equilibrium under different production costs.The results show that the retailer will choose prepayment financing when production costs are low.The retailer prefers bank financing when production costs are higher.However,within the production cost threshold,the retailer generally prefers buyer guarantee financing.Finally,Maple software is used to verify the important conclusions of the paper by numerical simulation through example analysis,which provides data support and reference for the decision-making of supply chain members.
Keywords/Search Tags:buyer financing, information asymmetry, capital constraint, Stackelberg game
PDF Full Text Request
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