Research On The Influence Of Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge On Real Earnings Management

The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge brings financing convenience to the listed company,but also has the risk of control transfer.Therefore,the controlling shareholder will also pay close attention to the stock price after the equity pledge,and has a strong motivation to choose the way of earnings management to increase.However,excessive earnings manipulation will not only damage the long-term value of listed companies but also damage the interests of investors and creditors.At present,the existing research is mainly on the linear impact,and the research on the nonlinear impact of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the real earnings management is also of great significance for the regulatory authorities to formulate policies and investors to choose investment targets.In this context,this paper firstly studies the nonlinear impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on real earnings management based on the data from 2010 to2020 to distinguish the full sample,state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Secondly,the liquidation risk indicators,internal governance variables-CFO’s ability to resist pressure are calculated,and external regulatory variables-key audit matters are obtained by using the text analysis technology of Python software.The mechanism of influence of the relationship is analyzed.The research results show that:(1)In state-owned enterprises,the impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on real earnings management is U-shaped,while in nonstate-owned enterprises,the impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on real earnings management is inverted U-shaped.The main innovation of this paper.(2)Further research finds that liquidation risk plays a mediating role in the inverted U shape of non-state-owned enterprises,while there is no significant mediating role in the U shape of state-owned enterprises.(3)Internal governance variable-CFO’s ability to resist pressure has a certain strengthening effect on the U-shaped relationship of stateowned enterprises,but it is not significant in non-state-owned enterprises.(4)External governance variables-key audit matters have a certain weakening effect on the U-shape of state-owned enterprises,which is not significant in non-state-owned enterprises.After considering the quality of corporate information disclosure,it shows that in companies with poor information disclosure quality,key audit matters have a significant moderating effect in both the U-shape of state-owned enterprises and the inverted Ushape of non-state-owned companies.By distinguishing the specific content of key audit matters,it is found that subdividing the various levels of key audit matters in stateowned enterprises does not play a moderating role in the U-shaped relationship between the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and real earnings management,but in nonstate-owned enterprises,the account level and other The key audit matters at the level have a certain moderating effect on the inverted U-shaped impact of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the real earnings management.