EVA Assessment,R&D Manipulation And Corporate Value

Innovation occupies a pivotal position in the overall situation of China’s modernization construction.Promoting enterprise technological innovation is the key to implementing the strategy of innovation-driven development,and promoting enterprise technological innovation requires further strengthening of enterprise research and development.In 2010,the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council first added economic value added(EVA)to the assessment indicators of the heads of central state-owned enterprises.Its purpose is not only to guide managers to pay attention to the long-term enterprise value of enterprises,not limited to short-term corporate performance,it also focuses on motivating companies to carry out R&D activities by setting R&D expense adjustment items in the EVA calculation process.In addition,other policies to encourage enterprises to carry out R&D activities have also been introduced,such as the identification of high-tech enterprises and the deduction of R&D expenses.At present,some scholars have found that the preferential policies of high-tech enterprise identification and R&D expenses deduction have played an incentive effect,and at the same time,some enterprises have inflated R&D expenditures to obtain policy preferences,that is,R&D manipulation.R&D manipulation has an adverse effect on a company’s future performance and value creation.Regarding EVA assessment,although there are relevant literatures proving that it can enhance the R&D enthusiasm of enterprises,there are few literatures discussing whether EVA assessment will also lead to R&D manipulation behavior.This thesis examines whether the implementation of EVA assessment will trigger central enterprises to conduct R&D manipulation,and further explores the mechanism of R&D manipulation in the relationship between EVA assessment and corporate value.This thesis firstly organizes relevant literature,discusses the relationship between EVA assessment,R&D manipulation and enterprise value,combines relevant concepts and theories,analyzes and puts forward research hypotheses;Then,this thesis takes the event of the comprehensive implementation of EVA assessment by central state-owned enterprises in 2010 as a natural experiment,selects 2008-2020 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research samples,and constructs a double-difference model;Finally,this study carries out regression analysis on the research samples according to the model,obtains the test results,and further uses a series of robustness test methods to ensure the robustness of the results.The study found that the implementation of EVA assessment will trigger some enterprises to conduct R&D manipulation;EVA assessment will inhibit the increase of the corporate value of central enterprises as a whole,which is partly due to the existence of positive R&D manipulation behavior of enterprises;The positive R&D manipulation behavior of enterprises played a mediating effect in the process of EVA assessment affecting the promotion of enterprise value.The conclusion of this thesis expands the research on the driving factors of enterprise R&D manipulation.On this basis,this thesis gives relevant suggestions to deal with R&D manipulation from the perspectives of assessment methods and supervision.This thesis helps the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council to ensure the incentive effect of EVA assessment on enterprise R&D activities by controlling R&D manipulation.