Research On The Impact Of Stock Incentives Of Employees On Operating Performance

As China’s economy enters a new normal,human capital has crucial strategic significance in economic development.Talent competition is the key to competition not only between countries but also between enterprises.As a kind of long-term salary incentive,equity incentive is very important in shaping the core competitiveness of enterprises.Therefore,the number of studies on equity incentive is increasing.At present,there have been some research pay attention to the relationship between equity incentive and company performance,but there are still two contradictory views: effective incentive and ineffective incentive.In addition,under the strategy like "strengthening the country with talents" and the intensive introduction of equity incentive system in China,more and more enterprises realize the importance of employees in business activities and extend the range of incentive object.However,the existing studies mainly explores the impact of equity incentive from the perspective of management,ignoring non-executive who master the professional knowledge and skills and play the crucial role in the transformation of achievements.Under the background of China,the primary goal of performance-based equity incentive is to improve the company’s operating performance.Therefore,the research on the effect of non-executive equity incentive should ultimately focus on the company’s operating performance.Based on this,this dissertation focus on whether the non-executive’s equity incentive can effectively motivate the company’s operating performance,and how to design the equity incentive plan under different management environments.Firstly,this dissertation defines the core concepts of non-executive’s equity incentive and company’s operating performance,and analyzes the relationship between non-executive’s equity incentive and company’s operating performance combined with relevant theories such as human capital theory.Secondly,other governance factors within the company are brought into the study of the relationship between them,and the regulatory role of the governance factor-board size is explored.Thirdly,it studies the heterogeneity of non-executive equity incentive plans at the individual level,and explores the differences of equity incentive effects under different management practices from the nature of property rights and industry characteristics.This dissertation selects the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2020 as the research sample.On the basis of the existing research,this dissertation explores the influence of non-executive equity incentive on the company’s operating performance.There are five main conclusions in this dissertation.First,there is a significant positive correlation between non-executive equity incentives and company performance.Second,restricted stock has the more significant incentive effect on the company’s operating performance compared with stock options.Third,the size of the board of directors can regulate the non-executive’s equity incentive and the company’s operating performance.Fourth,the impact of non-executive equity incentive on the company’s operating performance is affected by the nature of property rights,and the effect of non-executive equity incentive in state-owned enterprises is not obvious.Fifth,the high-tech industry and the non-advanced industry have different preferences for different incentive methods because of the difference in the target of equity incentive plan.It has the significant impact on implementing restricted stock in high-tech enterprises,while there is the significant impact on implementing stock options in non-high-tech industries.