The Influence Of Controlling Shareholders’ Equity Pledge On Total Factor Productivity Of Enterprises

In recent years,as a new financing way,equity pledge has an extremely rapid development trend.The equity pledge of controlling shareholders has become a more and more common phenomenon in China’s capital market.According to statistics,as of March 6,2022,2507 companies in China’s A-share market still have equity pledge behavior.Although equity pledge behavior can help controlling shareholders alleviate financing difficulties,the separation of two rights caused by equity pledge behavior also increases the motivation of controlling shareholders to"empty out" listed companies,As a result,there are many potential risks in equity pledge,which is being concerned by more and more scholars.As a key indicator to measure the sustainable development of enterprises in the long term,total factor productivity measures whether the production factors invested by enterprises can maximize the output profit,which is significant.However,at present,there are only few research on the relationship between equity pledge and total factor productivity,and there are obvious deficiencies in the discussion of the mechanism in the only research.Therefore,taking the total factor productivity of listed companies as the starting point,this paper studies the great influence of the controlled shareholders’ stocks pledge on the total factor productivity of listed companies,then discusses the action mechanism through the research of intermediary effect,and discusses the differences of enterprises with different property rights through the method of grouping regression,which enriches the research field of equity pledge.Firstly,based on the data from 2004 to 2020,this paper makes a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the current equity pledge market from the perspective of the scale,structural distribution,market overview and industry overview of equity pledge;Secondly,four research hypotheses are analyzed and put forward by using three different kinds of theory which is related to the essay;Thirdly,this paper selects the data of equity pledge in China’s A-share market from 2004 to 2020 as the research sample for empirical analysis,and draws the following empirical conclusions:(1)the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders plays a negative role in the total factor productivity of enterprises;(2)the rate of eqity pladge of controlling shareholders plays a negative role in the total factor productivity of enterprises;(3)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises has a greater negative impact on total factor productivity;(4)The inefficient investment behavior of enterprises plays an intermediary role,that is,the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders leads to the inefficient investment of listed companies,and then affects the total factor productivity of the company.Based on above research results,this paper comes out the following suggestions:(1)strengthen the norms of equity pledge and improve the requirements of disclosure standards;(2)Improve the financing channels of listed companies and develop financing methods;(3)Improve the internal governance structure of the company and establish and improve an effective check and balance mechanism.