| Since the rapid expansion of Internet economy,the growth of network platform enterprises has got a lot of attention.The research on platform business model innovation,growth path analysis of platform enterprises,ecological development of network platform enterprises and other topics has been hot.However,when enterprises pay more attention to model innovation and rapid growth,the internal and external risks of network platform enterprises have an opportunity to take advantage,so that the risk problems such as low user stickiness,serious homogenization problems and poor sustainable development ability of the platform continue to surge.Among them,the “lemon” risk caused by information asymmetry is a thorny problem that network platform enterprises have always existed and difficult to solve.Due to the lack of credit mechanism,it is difficult for platform parties,businesses and users in network platform enterprises to form an effective“strong connection”.Then under the influence of “lemon effect”,any party may break the balance and exit the transaction,which will damage the interests of network platform enterprises and greatly increase their vulnerability.Firstly,this study explored the “lemon” risk characteristics of network platform enterprises,and uses grounded coding analysis to extract the key risk factors in the “lemon effect”: adverse selection and moral hazard,as well as the influencing factors: network effect.Then,taking adverse selection and moral hazard as independent variables,the same-side network effect and cross-side network effect as regulatory variables,and platform enterprise performance as dependent variables,this paper constructs the structural equation research model related to the risk factors of “lemon effect” and the performance of network platform enterprises.Through the analysis of the data collected from 316 valid questionnaires by SPSS 26 software and AMOS24.0software,the results show that adverse selection and moral hazard have a significant inhibitory effect on the performance of network platform enterprises.Meanwhile,the same-side network effect will aggravate this inhibitory effect,while the cross-side network effect will weaken the inhibitory effect of adverse selection and moral hazard on enterprise performance to a certain extent.On this basis,corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for network platform enterprises to solve the “lemon” risk problem are given: Improve the product or service quality and safety supervision system in advance,build a bilateral user credit mechanism in advance,bring the positive influence of network effect into full play in the process,and perfect the service safeguard mechanism afterwards.Based on the regulation of network effect,this paper studies the “lemon effect” of network platform enterprises,theoretically enriches the relevant theoretical results of the formation mechanism and action mechanism of“lemon effect” of network platform enterprises,and expands the research methods and possibilities.Therefore,based on the research on the risk factors of “lemon effect” of network platform enterprises,this paper theoretically enriches the relevant theoretical results of the formation mechanism and action mechanism of “lemon effect” of network platform enterprises,and expands the research methods and possibilities.And in practice,it provides a feasible reference for the identification,judgment and governance of “lemon”risk problems of network platform enterprises.According to the process before and after the transaction,it uses more scientific and effective means to prevent or deal with “lemon” problems in network platform enterprises. |