The Influence Of Executive Over-confidence Of Listed Companies On Surplus Management

Surplus management is a hot topic in economics and accounting research at home and abroad,but in the process of studying it,in order to achieve the efficiency of research,it is often assumed that the executives of listed companies are rational people,and this assumption exists to a certain idealization.In the actual implementation process,the decisions made by the executives of listed companies in most cases are not completely rational.This paper explored the overconfidence of executives of listed companies,and taked the A-share listed companies as a research sample from 2015 to 2019,using the relative compensation of executives,the gender of the executives of the listed company,the appointment of the chairman and general manager,and the financial professional background of the executives are used as regulatory variables.The revised Jones model is used to measure the surplus management,taking the overconfidence of the executives of the listed company as the explanatory variable,and the surplus management behavior of the listed company as the explanatory variable,selecting the appropriate control variables and establishing the regression model,and using the multiple regression equation to study the impact of the overconfidence of the executives of the listed company on the surplus management.The results showed that the overconfident behavior of executives of listed companies is positively correlated with surplus management,and the more obvious the overconfidence behavior of executives,the greater the possibility of surplus management.Whether there are female executives,chairman and general manager positions among the executives of listed companies,whether they are two or different functions,and whether the executives have a financial knowledge background would have a certain impact on the surplus management of the enterprise.Companies with women executives can reduce the level of surplus management induced by executive overconfidence compared to companies without female executives.Compared with companies where the chairman and general manager are the same person,listed companies with two positions of chairman and general manager,respectively,can reduce the level of surplus management induced by executive overconfidence.Compared with executives without financial professional background,listed companies with financial professional background executives can reduce the level of surplus management induced by executive overconfidence.This paper puts forward relevant countermeasures,one is to increase the proportion of female executives,the second is to minimize one person who is also the chairman and general manager,the third is to increase financial expertise training for executives,the fourth is to improve the legal and disclosure system related to surplus management.