The Influence Of Executive Compensation Stickiness On Information Disclosure Quality Of Listed Companies

The information disclosure of listed companies is an important way to improve the governance of listed companies,and also the core of the regulatory authorities.However,in recent years,the information disclosure of listed ente rprises in China is illegal and irregular events emerge endless,the quality of information disclosure of listed enterprises urgently needs to be improved.Executives,as the actual managers of enterprises,play a vital role in information generation,info rmation processing and final information release in the process of enterprise information disclosure,and compensation incentive is the most commonly used way for enterprises to motivate senior executives.With the improvement of executive compensation disc losure system,executive compensation stickiness,a compensation incentive has gradually entered the public perspective and been widely debated.However,few scholars have paid attention to its impact on corporate information disclosure.Therefore,to clarify the relationship between executive compensation stickiness and corporate information disclosure behavior is of great significance to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure and improve the incentive mechanism of executive compensation.Based on the panel data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019,this thesis conducts an empirical analysis to study the impact of executive compensation stickiness on the quality of corporate information disclosure,and further discusses the influence mechanism difference of this relationship in different situations from the perspective of corporate life cycle and enterprise heterogeneity.The results show that :(1)the executive compensation stickiness has a significant negative impact on the information disclosure quality of listed companies.The executive compensation stickiness tends to lead to the negative effects of "excessive incentives" and satisfying the conditions of executive fraud,leading to the manipulation of corporate information disclosure by executives and the reduction of the quality of information disclosure.(2)In different stages of corporate life cycle,the impact of executive compensation stickiness on information disclosure quality of listed companies is different.Compared with companies in the mature and declining stage,companies in the growing stage have more significant negative effects on the quality of information disclosure due to large capital gap,imperfect governance mechanism and supervision mechanism,etc.(3)Low level of government intervention can mitigate the negative impact of executive compensation stickiness on information disclosure quality of listed companies.(4)When the market competition degree of the enterprise industry is low,the negative impact of executive compensation stickiness on the information disclosure quality of listed companies is more significant.(5)A sound legal environment will reduce and restrain inappropriate information manipulation by executives,and weaken the negative effect of executive compensation stickiness on the quality of information disclosure.(6)Further research shows that higher internal control quality can mitigate the negative impact of executive compensation stickiness on the quality of listed companies’ financial information disclosure,but has no significant effect on the quality of listed companies’ non-financial information disclosure.Compensation control policy can restrain the negative effect of executive compensation stickiness on information disclosure quality in state-owned enterprises.The research of this thesis provides important inspiration and reference value for enterprises to improve the compensation incentive mechanism and improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in different situations.