| The separation of ownership and management under modern enterpris e system has given rise to the problem of principal-agent,and perquisite consumption is one of the manifestations of agency cost.Since the state does not mandate the disclosure of information on perquisite consumption,it gives the information on perquisite consumption more hidden and difficult to monitor.Because of this,the original incentive function of perquisite consumption has gradually crossed the red line of "reasonable" and become a means for management to obtain private gains,which is manifested as "self-interest" perquisite consumption.The misuse of perquisite consumption will lead to waste of company resources and increase agency costs,which is very unfavorable to the company.Therefore,it becomes more and more important to strictly regulate management behavior and reduce the problem of perquisite consumption.In order to have direct governance effect on management,major shareholders will appoint their own executives to be executives of listed companies to strengthen their control over listed companies and truly participate in the process of corporate governance by way of vertical interlocked executives,but this method may also provide more channels for major shareholders to obtain private gains,thus resulting in the act of emptying company resources.Therefore,it remains to be tested whether vertical interlocked executives can really play an effective role in governance.Based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,management power theory and control theory,this paper provides a careful review of the relevant literature.This paper selects relevant data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to2020 for empirical analysis,focusing on the impact of vertical interlocked executives on perquisite consumption and the role played by management power on the relationship between the two.In order to have a deeper understanding of vertical interlocked executives,this paper conducts a heterogeneity analysis on the types and strengths of vertical interlocked executives to further explore the differences in the effects of vertical interlocked executives on perquisite consumption.The results of this paper confirm that vertical interlocked executive has a suppressive effect on management’s perquisite consumption behavior;this suppressive effect will be weakened as the power of management increases;the suppressive effect of chairman’s vertical interlocked appointment is more significant than that of CEO,and the higher the intensity of vertical interlocked executive appointment,the lower the level of perquisite consumption.Based on the research results,this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions on the regulation of the system related to perquisite consumption,the supervision effect of vertical interlocked executives and the reasonable allocation of management power,hoping to make a modest contribution to the improvement of corporate governance mechanism. |
