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Empirical Study On The Relationship Between Directors’ And Officers’ Liability Insurance And Corporate Risk-taking

Posted on:2023-03-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L Y ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306794472364Subject:Financial
Abstract/Summary:
With the frequent occurrence of thunderstorms in listed companies and the gradual tightening of regulatory environment,the relevant laws on investor protection are being studied and implemented by the state,and the relevant legal system is being gradually explored and improved.Investors’ awareness of self-protection and legal awareness of safeguarding their own rights and interests are awakening,and managers are increasingly involved in litigation cases.The promulgations of the new Securities Law,on the one hand,improve the protection of minority shareholders,on the other hand,also increase the punishment of violations of laws and regulations,and the probability of the company’s senior managers facing litigation risk is greatly increased.As a special professional liability insurance,D&O liability insurance is also an independent third-party external regulatory mechanism for management to avoid risks.Its effect on corporate governance has always been a hot topic in academic research.The level of enterprise risk-taking can effectively reflect the operating status and risk control ability of an enterprise.The level of enterprise risk-bearing can effectively reflect the operating status and risk control ability of an enterprise.The significance of enterprise risk-bearing capacity is self-evident,and its size directly affects the future development of company.Currently,about research literatures of D&O liability insurance and business risk-bearing level are more,but there are few researches on the relationship between D&O liability insurance and corporate risk-taking and its influencing path.The introduction of D&O liability insurance for the role of corporate governance in the academic circles there are two different views.Some scholars think enterprises by purchasing D&O liability insurance,equivalent to the insurance company for the enterprise as a third party supervision mechanism,can optimize the corporate governance,improve the performance of corporate management and the degree of commitment,to reduce enterprise risk level for enterprise to bring business performance.Other scholars believe that the purchase of D&O liability insurance by enterprises will make the management of listed companies more prone to moral hazard,and the purchase of D&O liability insurance is equivalent to providing "protection umbrella" for their violations and speculation,to make them more aggressively for risk-taking,so as to improve the level of risk of the enterprise,which is unfavorable for the long-term development of the enterprise.Then,will the introduction of D&O liability insurance play an external supervision effect or cause opportunistic behavior? The introduction of D&O liability insurance through what mechanism does it affect the level of corporate risk-taking? Based on the above considerations,this paper systematically combed the relevant literature on D&O liability insurance and corporate risk-taking,combined with theoretical research on the relationship between them and their impact path,and took the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to2019 as research samples for empirical test to explore the relationship between of D&O liability insurance and corporate risk-taking level.The conclusions of this paper are as follows: D&O liability insurance improves the risk-taking level of enterprises;For enterprises with violations,the introduction of D&O liability insurance does not improve corporate governance to reduce corporate risks,but increases the risk level;As a mediating variable,financing constraints play a partial mediating effect between D&O liability insurance and corporate risk taking,which indicates that the introduction of D&O liability insurance sends opportunistic signals to investors and leads investors to make adverse choices to reduce investment,thus exacerbating corporate financing constraints and enhancing corporate operating risks.
Keywords/Search Tags:Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, Corporate risk-taking, Corporate violation, Financing constraints, Opportunistic, External regulation
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