Research On The Influence Of Property Rights Structure Of Mixed Ownership Enterprises On Enterprise Performance

The mixed ownership reform of my country’s state-owned enterprises is in full swing,and the "14th Five-Year Plan" also emphasizes the need to deepen the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.One of the key points of mixed ownership reform is the optimization of property rights structure,and the existing literature shows that the optimization of property rights structure can improve enterprise performance to a certain extent.In the new round of mixed ownership reform,companies in competitive industries may become a breakthrough for mixed ownership reform.Therefore,looking at the impact of the property rights structure of mixed-ownership enterprises on enterprise performance from the perspective of industry competitiveness can not only help improve the overall design at the policy level,but also at the practical level.On the basis of exploring the mechanism of property rights structure and industry competition affecting enterprise performance of mixed-ownership enterprises,the principal component analysis method is used to measure the performance of A-share listed mixed-ownership enterprises from 2010 to 2020,and the two-way fixed effect model is used to test mixed ownership.The direct effect of enterprise property rights structure on enterprise performance,the moderating effect of industry competition and heterogeneity.The research results show that: for the direct effect of the property rights structure of mixed-ownership enterprises on corporate performance,firstly,the decrease of equity concentration under the diversification of property rights is not conducive to the improvement of corporate performance,but the phenomenon is weakened in the public welfare industry;Diversification of the nature of equity is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance,but this phenomenon is weakened in monopoly industries and public welfare industries.For the moderating effect of industry competition,firstly,industry competition can restrain the adverse impact of equity concentration decline on enterprise performance under property rights diversification;.Based on the research conclusions of this paper,the following suggestions are put forward: first,Chinese mixed-ownership enterprises should standardize the behavior of shareholders and establish a supervision mechanism to control them;Take back the invisible hand of the government,provide a market environment with free competition,stimulate the vitality of enterprises,and help the reform of mixed ownership.