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Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Science And Technology Cooperation In RCEP Countries

Posted on:2023-07-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L J LongFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306785957959Subject:Statistics
Abstract/Summary:
In the time of scientific and technological(S&T)globalization,how to deal with "the greatest changes in a century" ? How do break the "hedges in a century" of the international order? How do promote the further development of regional integration?International S&T cooperation provides an effective answer.This paper evaluates the S&T cooperation risks of each state of RCEP,at the same time,studies the impact of RCEP and third-party regulatory mechanisms on international S&T cooperation respectively.Then provide relevant suggestions for the selection of international S&T cooperation strategic partners in relevant countries and theoretical support for China to promote regional S&T cooperation under the framework of RCEP,and give an effective way to deeply integrate S&T cooperation under RCEP.Firstly,assess the risk of S&T cooperation among RCEP member countries and expand the risk assessment system for international S&T cooperation.By analyzing the influencing factors of transnational S&T cooperation,this paper proposes a risk evaluation index system for international S&T cooperation.Based on the principle of error minimization,the entropy method,the coefficient of variation method,and the CRITIC method are combined by the cross-entropy combination weighting method,to give each index the optimal weight.Then,the cloud model is introduced,and the standard cloud model is constructed by using the golden ratio.By calculating the parameters of the comprehensive cloud model of each country and comparing it with the standard cloud model,it can evaluate the risk level of S&T cooperation in various countries and provide theoretical guidance for the S&T cooperation of member states.Secondly,numerical simulation analyzes the evolutionary game of international S&T cooperation under RCEP and contributes Chinese wisdom to the promotion of regional S&T cooperation.Based on the assumption of bounded rationality,this paper sorts out the S&T cooperation interests of each member state establishes an evolutionary game model which has the two-subject and three-strategy,based on the cost of S&T innovation in each country,constructs a game profit matrix and analyzes the stability of the model.MATLAB is used to analyze the behavior of international S&T cooperation under RCEP,then the evolution of game strategies between game subjects before and after RCEP and the factors affecting game behavior is obtained,which provides theoretical guidance and policy suggestions for research in corresponding fields.Finally,numerical simulation analyzes the evolutionary game of international S&T cooperation under the intervention of the third-party regulatory mechanism and promotes RCEP to play an active role.In this paper,the intervention coefficient of the third-party regulatory mechanism is introduced into the evolutionary game model,its difference in different countries and different evolutionary game strategies is guaranteed,then the game income matrix is constructed and the stability of the model is analyzed.MATLAB is used to simulate the path of international S&T cooperation under different intervention levels,analyze and demonstrate the effectiveness of the third-party supervision mechanism for international S&T cooperation,and provide theoretical support for further promoting regional integration.
Keywords/Search Tags:RCEP, S&T cooperation, indicator empowerment, risk assessment, evolutionary game
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