In the process of development,smes often face the problem of insufficient funds,which restricts their development.Due to the low credit rating of enterprises and lack of adequate collateral,smes often find it difficult to obtain financing from banks.The rapid development of e-commerce makes small and medium-sized enterprises have a new way of financing,namely e-commerce financing.The emergence of e-commerce financing can greatly promote the fund operation of the supply chain.By controlling the operation and sales data of the supply chain,e-commerce platform can provide loan services for many small and medium-sized enterprises to meet the production and ordering needs of enterprises.E-commerce platforms provide loans with many benefits.On the one hand,e-commerce platforms can earn interest from loans;on the other hand,e-commerce platforms can increase the number of orders traded on the platform,bring more sales opportunities and collect commissions from them,thus increasing the income of e-commerce platforms.Therefore,this thesis considers a supply chain system composed of risk-averse retailers,risk-averse suppliers and risk-neutral platform enterprises,and considers the influence of capital constraints of suppliers or retailers and the competitive relationship between online retailers and platform enterprises.This thesis discusses three supply chain models: no capital constraint,retailer capital constraint and supplier capital constraint.Focus on:(1)risk aversion attitude of supplier and retailer and market uncertainty on the optimal decisions of the member enterprises of the supply chain and the impact of utility,(2)members under different optimal decision and the difference of utility,and(3)the influence of different decisions in order to the enterprise decision-making and utility,(4)the difference between bank financing and financing platform,through the analysis of these problems to solve,The following conclusions are obtained.(1)The risk aversion characteristics of retailers and suppliers will significantly affect the optimal decision of each member firm,and the effect depends on whether the retailers or suppliers have capital constraints.(2)The optimal retail price of both retailers and platform enterprises under supplier capital constraint is greater than that without capital constraint.The optimal retail price set by retailers and platform enterprises increases with the increase of supplier’s production cost,and the optimal retail price under retailer’s capital constraint is most significantly affected by supplier’s production cost in the three capital scenarios.(3)Regardless of whether the retailer or supplier has capital constraint,the improvement of retailer’s risk attitude will reduce retailer’s utility and improve supplier’s utility,while the improvement of supplier’s risk attitude will increase retailer’s utility and reduce supplier’s utility.(4)The effect of retailer and supplier’s risk aversion on supplier’s wholesale price,retailer’s and retailer’s retail price and supply chain’s utility is more significant than that of retailer and retailer’s decision on retail price.(5)When the cost is low,the loan interest rate of the platform will be higher than the bank interest rate,and it is more favorable for enterprises to choose bank financing.When the production cost is high,the loan interest rate of the platform will be lower than the bank interest rate,and it is more favorable for enterprises to choose platform financing. |