Influence Of Inquiry Regulation On The Quality Of Information Disclosure Of Listed Companies

Information disclosure is the act of a listed company to disclose the company’s prospectus,prospectus,listing announcement,periodic report and interim report according to the law.Through information disclosure,the degree of information asymmetry between investors and listed companies is suppressed,which also helps the capital market.The improvement of operating efficiency will ensure the stable and healthy development of the market.However,in the process of capital market transactions,the information disclosure of listed companies is often a problem-prone area: irregular and illegal behaviors such as false statements and insider trading occur from time to time.In order to make up for the shortcomings of traditional information disclosure supervision methods and further improve supervision efficiency,the China Securities Regulatory Commission has gradually transformed into a first-line supervision model.Listed companies publish regulatory inquiry letters and reply letters,thus forming the current inquiry letter disclosure system.A common tool for surveillance,its market and social influence is also growing.Therefore,it is a matter of great concern to ask whether this innovative regulatory means can be effective and what its impact will be.In order to explore the effectiveness of the inquiry supervision mechanism and its impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,this paper uses the KV value calculated by the KV measurement method as an indicator to measure the quality of information,and selects the relevant data of A-share listed companies in my country from 2015 to 2020.,to construct a fixed-effects panel model for empirical analysis.The study found that the KV value of the listed companies inquired has decreased significantly.Since the KV value has a negative correlation with the information disclosure quality of listed companies,a lower KV value indicates that the exchange’s inquiry is indeed more conducive to the information of listed companies.The improvement of disclosure quality,that is,inquiry supervision has the effect of information governance,and improves the authenticity and effectiveness of information disclosure of listed companies through supervision and "warning".In the same way,the more inquiry letters a listed company receives,the more obvious the role of supervision and supervision.Therefore,the more inquiries,the more conducive it is for the listed company to improve the level of its information disclosure behavior and the quality of information disclosure in a timely manner.In addition,the effect of inquiry supervision on the quality of information disclosure of state-owned enterprises is not significant,indicating that the effectiveness of inquiry mechanism may be weakened by the “state-owned”background of enterprises.Finally,compared with the target of margin financing and securities lending,the KV value of the inquired listed companies that are not the target of margin financing and securities lending is much lower,that is,for the listed companies that are not the target of margin financing and securities lending,the exchange’s inquiry supervision can be better.To play the role of information governance,the quality of its information disclosure will be improved more.The reason may be that the margin financing and securities lending mechanism has already played a part of the role of information governance,so there may be a certain substitution relationship between the margin financing and securities lending mechanism and the inquiry supervision mechanism.