| In 2018,the risk of equity pledge broke out in China,a large number of equity pledge was the biggest risk factor causing the stock market thunder,and in this event,the controlling shareholder’s role is particularly obvious.Under the background of financial deleveraging,financial regulators also pay more attention to the capital investment of equity pledge business,and hope to strengthen the disclosure standards to prevent operating risks.Existing studies have attached great importance to the equity pledge business,but most of them only use the superficial data such as whether the pledge business is carried out or not,equity pledge ratio and so on,and the discussion on the equity pledge guarantee of controlling shareholders is rare,and does not involve the investment direction of pledge funds directly reflecting the characteristics of its behavior.Through the discussion of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders,we can find that in the announcement,the investment direction of pledge financing can be divided into four categories.Does it have a different impact on business risk? What role will institutional investors and corporate managers play in the process,except for the controlling shareholders?Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory,this paper empirically analyzes all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2007-2020 by panel data model,and tests the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and listed companies’ operating risks.The results show that: firstly,the higher the proportion of equity pledge of controlling shareholders,the higher the operating risks of enterprises;secondly,the managers’ risk preference has a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between equity pledge and the operating risks of enterprises;thirdly,the operating risks of enterprises are greater when the funds of equity pledge of controlling shareholders are invested in the controlling shareholders or a third party;fourthly,the institutional investors’ shareholding ratio has no obvious promotion effect on the investment of pledge funds in the operating risks of enterprises;fifthly,compared with state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between the proportion of equity pledge and the investment of pledge funds and the operating risks of enterprises is more significant.Based on the above analysis results,this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures from the listed companies and the status of equity pledge.First,improve the company system,improve the governance of listed companies.Second,we should determine the direction of investment funds,increase efforts to open.Third,we should improve the legal system and strengthen the rule of law.Fourth,we should improve the functions of financial institutions,strengthen the evaluation and supervision of equity pledge.This paper is helpful to improve the research framework of the factors affecting the operating risk of enterprises,and enrich the research on the economic consequences of the investment of the controlling shareholders’ equity pledge funds. |
