Performance Commitment,Information Asymmetry And Financing Constraints

With the rapid development of China’s economy,Chinese companies have developed rapidly,and more and more companies have carried out mergers and acquisitions to expand industrial scale,optimize and upgrade industrial structure to increase the market share of the industry in which the company operates.Mergers and acquisitions are increasingly appearing in the capital market,and performance commitment,as a tool used more and more in mergers and acquisitions,is a product developed from foreign gambling agreements and transformed locally,has been revised several times since the announcement in 2008,and the relevant clauses are now relatively mature,and are used more and more in mergers and acquisitions.Financing constraints generally exist in various enterprises.Rapidly developing companies have greater investment and financing needs,while companies that implement mergers and acquisitions have stronger demand for industrial expansion and capital.Therefore,we should pay close attention to corporate financing constraints.In order to explore how to better accelerate the development of enterprises to meet the capital needs of enterprises,it is the focus of all parties to find a mechanism that can alleviate financing constraints.Information asymmetry is an inevitable phenomenon that exists between enterprises and between enterprises and investors.In order to make various transactions more open and transparent,to protect the interests of all parties in the capital market,and to promote the healthy development of my country’s capital market,it came into being.However,many scholars are skeptical about performance commitments themselves,because performance commitments may in some cases become a tool for corporate speculative arbitrage to damage the interests of others.Therefore,whether the introduction of performance commitment can reduce the level of information asymmetry of all parties,so as to truly protect the rights and interests of all parties,including whether it can alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises,is the key content of this paper.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: First,from the perspective of research,previous researches by scholars have mainly focused on the economic consequences of performance commitments themselves,while less research has been done on the changes in future investment and financing needs of enterprises caused by the occurrence of performance commitments.Second,in the research chain,there are existing studies on the impact of performance commitment on reducing information asymmetry,and the impact of the introduction of performance commitment on corporate financing constraints,but no scholars have studied how the introduction of performance commitment reduces the information asymmetry of enterprises.Asymmetry to ease the degree of financing constraints,and whether the mechanism is an intermediary effect.Third,in terms of research methods,most of the existing research on performance commitment is based on case analysis.This paper uses the empirical method and selects the data of the signing of performance commitment events in mergers and acquisitions since 2010-2020 for a large sample empirical analysis.,adding data and empirical research support for related research.This paper puts forward the hypothesis by summarizing and analyzing the actual capital market situation of related theories such as information asymmetry,principal-agent theory and option theory.By selecting a total of 13,905 data on mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in my country from 2010 to 2020 as a sample,the stepwise regression method is used to analyze whether the introduction of performance commitments can alleviate financing constraints,and information asymmetry is tested to verify the hypothesis of this paper.The empirical results show that the introduction of performance commitments can alleviate the phenomenon of financing constraints,and information asymmetry is the mediating variable.This conclusion does not have an obvious effect in state-owned enterprises,but the effect is very obvious in non-state-owned enterprises,and the effect is more prominent in enterprises with high external attention.According to the conclusions obtained in this paper,relevant tips can be given to external investors,and relevant suggestions at the information disclosure level can also be put forward to enterprises and relevant regulatory agencies.