| In the era of digital economy,a large number of Internet enterprises with platform models have emerged and developed rapidly.The expression of industrial organization and industrial structure has initially completed the transformation from unilateral market to bilateral market.As a new form of industrial organization,the two-sided market is of great significance and wide application in the modern economy,and the current academic consensus is that the two-sided market has two major characteristics: the price structure is not neutral and the externality of the cross-border network.This article defines it as a general feature of the two-sided market.Most current research into traditional two-sided markets has divided bilateral consumers into two "disconnected" consumer groups,each one on one side of the market,to make decisions independently.However,according to the actual situation,there is often overlap between consumer groups,so the decisions made by consumers are not independent.This "overlapping" consumer user is defined herein as "dual user",and the two-sided market where there is a "double user" is referred to as a "mixed two-sided market".The existence of double users reflects the peculiarities of such two-sided markets.If you ignore the existence of this particularity,it is likely to cause the platform to misunderstand the actual needs of users,and eventually lead to the wrong pricing strategy of the platform.The main research content of this thesis is to study the generality and particularity of the two-sided market based on the existing theory of the two-sided market.There are many examples of special two-sided markets in reality,such as the knowledge payment platform selected in this article,the knowledge payment platform is not only a typical two-sided market,but also because the users of the knowledge payment platform deliver mostly intangible goods,the user groups often overlap,so the larger scale of double users is more representative,so this platform is selected to study the mixed two-sided market in depth.According to the current situation of the knowledge payment industry and the characteristics of platform enterprises,this thesis constructs the charging model of the user single attribution behavior of the knowledge payment platform for two-sided users and the pricing model of the dual knowledge payment platform when the user is multiattributed,solves the balanced pricing and profit of the platform in different situations,analyzes the results and discusses the practical significance in depth,and finally draws conclusions and corresponding management implications.In view of this,this thesis starts from the generality and particularity of knowledge payment platforms,and focuses on the "double users" and pricing decision-making problems of mixed two-sided markets.Firstly,based on the general characteristics,the analysis is carried out,and then the pricing joint decision of the platform and the pricing decision of the differentiated platform are analyzed in depth according to the characteristics of the platform that have different effects on users on both sides.Finally,the conclusion of the study shows that:(1)The existence of double users under the single attribution of users will prompt the platform to increase the pricing of the demand side and reduce the price of the knowledge supplier.(2)Under the three charging models,only when the ratio of the scale of supply and demand two-sided users reaches a certain value,the proportion of double users can increase the profit of the platform.(3)When there are double users under the multiple attribution of users,the combination of other factors will have different effects on the profits of the platform,and this bonus ratio adjusted by the increase in the proportion of double users in the platform reflects the characteristics of the "particularity" of the mixed two-sided market.Further,the optimal pricing strategy of the platform in different environments is derived.This thesis provides a micro-level theoretical support for the development of the knowledge payment industry in the mixed two-sided market.In order to provide valuable suggestions for the development and competition of digital platform enterprises in reality,and contribute to the theory of enterprise competition in two-sided markets.The research results show that:(1)The existence of double users under the single attribution of users will prompt the platform to increase the pricing of the demand side and reduce the price of the knowledge supplier side.(2)Under the three charging models,only when the ratio of the scale of supply and demand double users reaches a certain value,the proportion of double users can increase the profit of the platform.(3)When there are double users under multiple user attribution,the combination of other factors will have different impacts on the profits of the platform.This surcharge ratio adjusted by the increase in the proportion of double users in the platform reflects the characteristics of the "particularity" of the mixed two-sided market,and further derives the optimal pricing strategy of the platform in different environments.This thesis can provide new ideas for platform enterprises that also have the particularity of two-sided markets,and provide micro-level theoretical support for the development of the knowledge payment industry in the mixed two-sided market.In order to provide valuable suggestions for the development and formulation of competitive strategies for the development of today’s digital platform enterprises,and contribute to the theory of corporate competition in twosided markets. |
