Research On The Incentive Strategy Of Emergency Material Storage Enterprises Under The Mode Of Government-enterprise Cooperation

Under the situation of frequent emergencies across the country,emergency supplies collection and storage has become a hot topic for Chinese scholars.Effective emergency supplies collection and storage is a key link in disaster prevention and mitigation,which has a direct impact on the smooth development of emergency rescue work.Therefore,building a scientific and reasonable emergency supplies reserve system is the basic guarantee for the country to improve emergency management capabilities and maintain the stable development of society.From the perspective of the government,this article discussed how to improve the emergency supplies reserve system in terms of the selection of emergency supplies agent enterprises,the incentives of the enterprises and the early warning of incentive failure risks under the joint reserve of government and enterprises,which can improve the government’s emergency management level,enhance the comprehensive emergency response capabilities of the society,and has theoretical and practical significance.First of all,the article discussed how to scientifically select emergency supplies reserve agent enterprises.By analyzing the difference between emergency supplies reserve enterprises and general suppliers,this article used Principal Component Analysis to construct an evaluation index system for agent enterprises of emergency supplies with 7 dimensions and 28 factors.It used the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory(DEMATEL)to verify the indexes,which further proved the rationality and scientificalness of the system.The interval value hesitant fuzzy entropy method was used to determine the index weight,and the interval number is introduced into the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to construct the selection model of the emergency supplies agent enterprises.On the basis of the selection of the emergency supplies agent enterprises,the government’s incentive mechanism under the situation of the government-enterprise game is studied from the two incentive measures of pricing strategy and cash subsidy.In the pricing strategy,the government’s optimal procurement pricing strategy is further analyzed by exploring the reserve decision-making of the agent enterprises under the coordination of government flexible procurement price,government spot procurement price and the probability of occurrence of emergencies;in the cash subsidy,this article established a governmententerprise evolutionary game model to analyze the government’s incentive effect on enterprises,the results showed that the government can encourage the agent enterprises to produce more reserves than the equilibrium points by setting the subsidy ceiling and increasing the capacity reserves.In order to reduce the risk of failure of government incentives for enterprises,this article analyzed the key risk factors of government incentive failures among the three participants of the market,enterprises and government,constructed a risk evaluation index system for government incentive failures,and used Bayesian networks to build a risk early warning model.By constructing a light signal model,it is possible to intuitively give warnings to risks.