Research On The Influence Of QFII Shareholding On Investment Efficiency Of Enterprises

Investment activities are the core of corporate financial management,and the problem of principal-agent relationship and information asymmetry leads to the phenomenon of inefficient investment.After the establishment of my country’s QFII system,the State Administration of Foreign Exchange has gradually relaxed restrictions on all aspects of QFII,and the internationalization of the capital market has entered a new stage.Therefore,studying how the injection of international capital will affect the investment behavior of enterprises is not only conducive to broadening the research field of QFII,providing a new research perspective for the relationship between investors and enterprises,but also urging enterprises to make rational investment decisions,It has practical guiding significance for the QFII system.This paper takes the A-share listed companies held by QFII as the research object.On the basis of sorting out the previous study outcome,based on principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,connected with the development status of the QFII system in our country,from the improvement of corporate governance and financial information.From the perspective of disclosure quality,its mechanism of action is analyzed.Using the A-share market data from 2003 to the third quarter of 2021,a multiple regression model was established to explore the impact of QFII shareholding on corporate investment efficiency.The different effects of stocks on the investment efficiency of enterprises;further,the mediating role of agency cost and the quality of financial information disclosure is studied;finally,robustness and endogeneity tests are carried out.This paper draws the following research conclusions:(1)QFII shareholding significantly inhibits the inefficient investment of enterprises,and inhibits both overinvestment and under-investment,but from the perspective of regression coefficients,it has a stronger inhibitory effect on over-investment;(2))to analyze the heterogeneity of enterprises.Under different degrees of government control,QFII shareholding has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment of enterprises,and the inhibitory effect on non-state-owned enterprises is stronger;The nonefficiency investment of enterprises all play a significant inhibitory role,and the inhibitory effect is stronger for companies with high equity balance;(3)The mediation effect analysis shows that QFII shareholding can inhibit the non-efficiency investment of enterprises by reducing agency costs and improving the quality of financial information disclosure.Based on the research conclusions of this paper,the government and regulatory authorities should appropriately lower the entry threshold of QFII,actively guide and encourage QFII to participate in corporate governance,and listed companies should optimize the governance structure,improve the information disclosure system,improve the investment process,and improve investment efficiency.The innovation of this paper is that it focuses on QFII,an important and special institutional investor,and explores the impact of QFII shareholding on corporate investment activities from a quantitative perspective,while fully considering corporate heterogeneity.However,the consideration of the heterogeneity of QFII and the selection of investment efficiency measurement indicators are still insufficient,which is the direction of further research in the future.