The Impact Of Managerial Ownership On Corporate Debt Financing Cost

The sixth plenary session of the 19 stressed that a more sustainable economic development was requested,nowadays China’s upgrading economy has been on a line of stable road in the golden age.Financial support is the source and foundation of corporate development affecting the high-quality process and the cost of debt financing determines the speed of corporate development.The behavior of managerial ownership reduces principal-agent cost and executives hold more conducive information,while they become shareholders they are double identified.It means when they run the companies,they would combine the development of enterprises and their own interests,reducing the financing cost of information asymmetry and other increasing costs.In this way,we could achieve our goal of minimizing costs.Take Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange listed company public data between 2015 to 2020 as the research object,putting the managerial ownership as an independent variable indicator and the quality of enterprise’s information disclosure as an intervening variable into the empirical model,this paper examines the influencing mechanism and effect of managerial ownership on the debt financing cost of listed companies according to the nature of company property rights.It also verifies the intermediary role of the quality of information disclosure.The empirical results indicate that there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of managerial ownership and the cost of debt financing.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the proportion of managerial ownership in non-state-owned enterprises has a more obvious effect on the debt financing cost of enterprises.The quality of information disclosure is significantly negatively correlated with the cost of debt financing,and the quality of information disclosure plays an intermediary role in the impact of managerial ownership on the cost of debt financing.Based on the conclusions of this paper,the following policies are suggested: In the first place,we are supposed to actively encourage the senior executives of enterprises to hold more shares of the company.Secondly,in order to improve the business vitality of enterprises,we should constantly improve and optimize the evaluation system and evaluation mechanism of the quality of enterprise information disclosure.At last,we had better strengthen and improve the external supervision and management ability to ensure the effectiveness and authenticity of information disclosure.As a supplement to the relevant research in the field of corporate debt financing cost,this paper opens a new pattern for the company on how to reduce the external debt financing cost,improve the ability of operation and promote the efficiency of investment.