| The separation of enterprise ownership and management leads to the "principalagent" problem in the process of enterprise governance,which has a great impact on the improvement of enterprise performance and the realization of long-term value.In order to solve this problem,different forms of equity incentive models have been created by governments and relevant enterprises,and are considered to be a feasible way to effectively solve the "principal-agent" paradox.From China’s practice,the mixed models of stock option,restricted stock,employee stock ownership plan and various equity incentive models have been widely used in reality.The practice of these models is considered to effectively improve the business performance of enterprises.At the same time,some scholars believe that equity incentive may not be an effective way to solve the "principal-agent" problem,because it may induce new"principal-agent" problems,and even lead to new earnings management.The emergence of these problems may reduce the level of enterprise performance.In this context,it is very important to systematically study the impact of equity incentive on China’s enterprise performance.This thesis studies the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance based on the relevant samples of former small and medium-sized board listed companies from 2011 to 2018.Firstly,based on the mathematical literature at home and abroad,this paper studies the application of "principal-agent" theory,incentive theory and incomplete contract theory in this paper.Secondly,this paper studies the theoretical transmission path of enterprise equity incentive affecting enterprise performance,and then this paper puts forward the research hypothesis according to the existing research results and relevant reality.Then,this paper uses sys GMM model to verify the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance and the differences of the impact of different equity incentive modes on enterprise performance,verifies the regulatory effect of enterprise scale,equity nature and internal information symmetry,and empirically analyzes some intermediary effects of"R&D" investment and strategic flexibility in the process of enterprise equity incentive affecting enterprise performance.Finally,this paper summarizes and prospects the full text.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:first,enterprise equity incentive will have a positive impact and a negative impact on enterprise performance at the same time.The two effects are complex and staggered and affect each other.Second,the equity incentive of China’s small and medium-sized board listed companies can significantly improve the performance level of enterprises.Compared with stock option,restricted stock,an equity incentive model,can more effectively promote the improvement of enterprise performance.Third,compared with non-stateowned enterprises,the effect of equity incentive on performance is weaker in stateowned enterprises;Compared with small-scale enterprises,equity incentive in largescale enterprises plays a stronger role in improving performance;Compared with the enterprises with the weak internal information symmetry,equity incentive of the enterprises with the strong internal information symmetry is more helpful to improve enterprise performance.Fourth,in the process of promoting enterprise performance under the influence of equity incentive,enterprise R&D investment and strategic flexibility has a local intermediary effect. |
