| After the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares,China’ s securities market has completed the task of transforming from a semitradable market to a fully tradable market.The major shareholders,who originally only relied on the increase of the company’s net assets to obtain investment income,can obtain the circulation right and reduce the shares they hold in the secondary market to cash out,so as to obtain greater income.The insider status of major shareholders of listed companies gives them much more information advantages than minority shareholders,which will give the major shareholders the ability to choose the most favorable time to reduce their holdings in the process of reducing holdings.However,the current domestic securities market is still full of such large shareholders reducing their holdings,their profit-seeking behavior continues to damage the rights and interests of minority shareholders,but also affect the order and healthy development of the securities market.However,it is also difficult to effectively supervise the reduction behavior of major shareholders,among which it is extremely difficult to distinguish the reduction behavior of malicious cash profit from the reasonable reduction behavior in line with the normal market transaction rules.Therefore,identifying the divestment behaviors of major shareholders based on different motivations and then analyzing the economic consequences caused by their divestment behaviors can have a deeper theoretical understanding of the divestment behaviors of major shareholders and help to further regulate and supervise such behaviors,which has both theoretical and practical significance.This article is based on the principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory and information theory,using literature research case method and event study method,through the study of literature at home and abroad,and selected multiple large shareholders holdings of Beijing Ourpalm Co.,Ltd as the research object,from the behavior of major shareholders holdings motivation and economic consequences researches in two aspects.Through the research,it can be found that different types of large shareholders will choose to reduce their shares for different reasons and thus cause different economic consequences.On the one hand,both controlling shareholders and noncontrolling shareholders may reduce their holdings due to their judgment on the enterprise and macro-economy or simple profit motive of cashing out.On the other hand,controlling shareholders may also reduce their holdings to promote the completion of the company’s strategic objectives.And from cash profit motive most positions can lead to negative economic consequences,including the influence enterprise operating performance,and damage the interest of minority shareholders,disrupt the company’s market shares,etc.,different from the motivation of negative economic consequences,holdings of the company development strategy,such as the introduction to the employee stock ownership plan and the strategic investors holdings,It can offset the negative effects caused by partial initial reduction of major shareholders’ holdings,and may have positive effects in the short term,that is,the improvement of enterprise business conditions and the recovery of enterprise market value.Finally,based on the above research results,this paper draws inspiration from different perspectives of strengthening government supervision,improving corporate governance structure and improving the quality of shareholders themselves,which also provides some reference for China’s securities market to continue to strengthen the reasonable norms of major shareholders’divestment behavior. |
