Research On Equity Pledge,Internal Control Quality And "Tunneling" Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders

In recent years,with the continuous introduction of various financial risk prevention measures,many financing means have been restricted.Equity pledge as a new means of financing security has become the focus of the public.As of 2020,statistics show that in Shanghai and Shenzhen,3,347 enterprises have realized equity pledge on the listed board.In addition,a large part of the controlling shareholders have carried out a series of continuous pledge operations,and more than half of the listed enterprises have pledged the actual number of less than 30%.Enterprises pledging as controlling shareholders accounted for 58.93% of the total,and 11.08% of listed companies pledged more than 90% of the total.But when shareholders enjoy the convenience of equity pledge,the phenomenon of "hollowing out" of the enterprise also frequently appears.Considering the background of relevant laws and regulations in China,is the financing direction and investment direction of the controlling shareholder after the pledge reasonable and does it damage the interests of the enterprise? We desperately need an answer.Therefore,we need to explore how to prevent and restrain the "tunneling" behavior under the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity.This article is based on a series of topics related professional theory study,such as the entrusted agency,such as asymmetric information theory,and the separation of cash flow right and tunnel effect theory,which will be the controlling shareholder equity pledge is divided into two perspectives,behavior and scale,we research the hollowed specific impact of the listed company,analysis the influence mechanism between the variables,At the same time,internal control quality is introduced as the threshold variable to study the optimal solution of internal control quality.In this paper,listed companies within the period of 2012-2019 are selected as research samples to carry out empirical analysis under the conditions of A-share.At the same time,combined with the case of Pengqi,the paper analyzes the behavior path of "tunneling" by controlling shareholders of listed companies under equity pledge.:(1)the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders makes them more inclined to "hollow out" enterprises;(2)The stock pledge scale of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the hollowing behavior of listed companies;(3)The quality of internal control has a threshold effect on the "tunneling" behavior under equity pledge of controlling shareholders;(4)The quality of internal control has a threshold effect on the "tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders under different equity pledge scales.At the same time,the case of Pengqi is added to deeply study the connection between internal control and controlling shareholders,that is,how the listed company is affected by the "tunneling" behavior in the case of equity pledge.According to the research,when the internal control effect of the company is lost,the controlling shareholders will have a stronger motivation to "hollow out".Finally,based on the above empirical and case study results,suggestions are put forward for the internal management and external supervision departments of enterprises: 1.Improve the ability to build the internal control system of listed companies;2.Improve the governance structure of listed companies;3.Improve relevant systems and policies.