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Emergency Management Supervision Strategy Of Pharmaceutical Enterprises Under Sudden Public Health Events

Posted on:2023-08-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B J LuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306620469884Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Sudden public health events seriously endanger public health,economic development,social stability and national security.Responding to sudden public health events requires not only the establishment of a sound emergency management system,but also the participation of multiple parties.We consider various situations such as new media participation,public participation,government reward and punishment mechanism,and construct the game models of multi-party participation,which includes the government department,pharmaceutical enterprises,new media,and the public,solve the stable equilibrium point of each game party’s strategy choices,and analyze the stability of the strategy combination based on the first method of Lyapunov.Finally,the simulation analysis was carried out using Matlab 2020 b to verify the validity and credibility of the models.We have gotten the following conclusions.Firstly,the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism can encourage pharmaceutical enterprises to actively participate in emergency management.However,when the degree of reward and punishment is small,pharmaceutical enterprises’ strategic choices are unstable and whether they actively participate in emergency management is closely related to the strategic choices of new media and the public.Secondly,when new media make true reports,they can promote the participation of pharmaceutical enterprises in emergency management;when new media make false reports,the impact on pharmaceutical enterprises’ strategic choices is unstable.With the greater the loss of false reports to the profits of pharmaceutical enterprises and the less compensation they receive from new media,pharmaceutical enterprises are more inclined to choose not to actively participate in emergency management.What’s more,increasing the probability of public complaints and reports can prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to actively participate in emergency management.The probability of public complaints and reports is positively related to the rewards;when the public participate,whether the public can play a regulatory role depends on the authenticity of the evaluations,and the verification of public feedback evaluations by new media can improve the probability of true evaluations.Fourthly,when the probability of the new media’s true report and the probability of the public’s true evaluation increase,the government’s stabilization strategy will change to strict implementation of the emergency management system,that is,the true reports of new media and the true evaluation of the public can play the role in supervising the government department.In addition,the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism for the government department can also prompt the government department to strictly implement the emergency management system.To sum up,the research enriches and expands the theoretical basis of pharmaceutical enterprise emergency management supervision under sudden public health events.Otherwise,it puts forward countermeasures and suggestions.
Keywords/Search Tags:pharmaceutical enterprises, sudden public health events, emergency management, multiple-party participation, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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