Executive Pay Gap,Executive Team Heterogeneity And Enterprise Investment Efficiency

Principal-agent is an important issue in modern corporate governance.Executive compensation is an important part of enterprise compensation contract management.By effectively encouraging executives,we can alleviate the principal-agent problem caused by information asymmetry.In addition to the salary level,the salary of senior executives will also be compared,thus affecting the decision-making of the enterprise.Therefore,establishing an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism to make the executive compensation gap really play a positive incentive role has become a hot issue.For an enterprise,whether it can make a correct investment decision is very important for the sustainable and stable development of the enterprise.Even if the enterprise has sufficient capital reserves,if the investment decision is wrong,it will have an irreversible negative impact on the development of the enterprise.Therefore,it is urgent to achieve long-term and stable development,improve investment efficiency and improve investment quality.According to the theory of senior leadership,the different personal backgrounds of senior managers,such as gender,age,educational background,tenure and work experience,will affect their values,thinking mode and behavior choice Then affect the investment decision of enterprises.Therefore,this paper will link the relationship between internal salary gap and enterprise investment efficiency,increase the heterogeneity of senior management team,and explore its impact on the relationship between internal salary gap and investment efficiency.Company This thesis adopts literature research method,empirical research method and other research methods,combs and summarizes the previous literature,analyzes and puts forward theoretical assumptions based on principal-agent theory,tournament theory and senior manager echelon theory,and selects a series of variables to build an empirical research model between executive internal salary gap and enterprise investment efficiency,Taking China’s listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as the overall research sample,this thesis makes an empirical test to explore the mechanism of executive internal salary gap on investment efficiency,and on this basis,to explore the regulatory effect of executive team heterogeneity,in order to enrich the research in related fields.The research results are as follows:first,the internal salary gap of senior executives can inhibit the low efficiency of enterprise investment behavior and improve the efficiency of enterprise investment to a certain extent;Secondly,in the diversity of high skilled managers,the difference of managers’ age and education reduces the inhibitory effect of managers’internal salary gap on enterprise investment efficiency,while the salary difference between men and women in senior positions reduces the inhibitory effect of managers’ internal salary gap on enterprise investment efficiency,Strengthen the restraining effect of the salary gap within the management on the inefficient investment of enterprises;Third,the impact of the salary gap of non listed companies on the internal performance of non listed companies.Based on the salary gap of senior management system,this paper studies the impact of salary gap of senior management system on inefficient investment of enterprises,and adds the research perspective of heterogeneity of senior management team,Conduct a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the salary difference within the senior management system to stimulate the effect.This study can be used as the entry point for the development of high-quality salary in China,further improve the incentive system of high-quality management salary,further improve the senior management team,and help enterprises improve investment efficiency.