| Algorithms are the rules of operation in the network world,and given the initial conditions,this series of instructions will automatically give the corresponding answers.Platform companies use algorithms to control the labor behavior of delivery workers in algorithmic rules,by developing algorithmic mechanisms to control the route,order taking,punishment and reward of delivery workers.However,the excessive focus on the economic benefits of algorithms often makes companies ignore the damage they can do to stakeholders’rights.A series of social hotspots such as the "takeaway worker dilemma" and "big data killing" are triggering people to reflect on the algorithm itself.Therefore,it is necessary to internalize corporate social responsibility into corporate governance to check and balance the negative impact caused by excessive use of algorithms.The emergence of dynamic incentives is expected to be an effective way for Internet delivery platforms to counteract the excessive "squeeze" of algorithms on delivery workers,which is not only a unique attempt to innovate the internal labor regulation system of Internet delivery platform companies at this stage,but also a new model of flexible labor market regulation for the whole platform companies.Dynamic incentive refers to the new labor rights compensation mechanism of the Internet take-out platform enterprises in the context of increasingly refined algorithms and improved efficiency,i.e.,through multiple incentive methods such as real money and platform virtual points,to provide reasonable probation and positive guidance to the non-compliant labor behavior of the take-out workers affected by the algorithm,and reduce the non-compliant labor behavior caused by the cold algorithm.Dynamic incentive mechanism is the current Internet takeaway platform relying on big data,cloud computing,and other technologies to match the historical order completion of the takeaway staff,by tracking the actual situation of the current takeaway staff to complete the order for the corresponding dynamic incentive or punishment,to punish the non-compliant labor behavior of the takeaway staff,and to incentivize the compliant labor behavior,so as to reduce the coldness and distance of the algorithm regulation and strengthen the humanization and personalization of the platform labor governance.and personalization,so as to realize the solid development of platform economy.Therefore,the research of the paper focuses on analyzing the evolutionary game relationship between the interactive behavioral strategy choices of Internet take-out platform enterprises and take-out workers under the dynamic incentive mechanism,and finding out the key factors in this model that influence the choice of Internet take-out platform enterprises to implement dynamic incentives and the choice of compliant labor behaviors by take-out workers,so as to better promote the development of the flexible labor market of the platform economy for the better.This paper first conducts a multidimensional basic research on the labor control relationship between Internet take-out platform enterprises and take-away workers,which mainly contains the following three parts:first,it analyzes the regulatory dilemmas and potential problems of the current algorithm-led labor control system of Internet take-out platform enterprises and the sufficient necessity of implementing dynamic incentive mechanisms;second,it discusses and studies the labor process control of Internet platform enterprises through historical literature for The second is to discuss and study the historical literature on labor process control of Internet platform enterprises,and to compare and analyze the labor process control process from traditional enterprises to Internet platform enterprises,and to obtain the nodes and factors that need to be optimized in the labor process control of Internet takeaway platform enterprises at the current stage.Based on this,the paper compares and analyzes the real labor scenarios of the takeaway workers with the operation process of the takeaway platform,and gets the key factors affecting the choice of the interaction strategy between the labor behavior of the takeaway workers and the Internet takeaway platform;Third,combining the influencing factors,the paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the interaction strategy of the labor behavior between the takeaway workers and the Internet takeaway platform enterprise under dynamic incentives with the help of evolutionary game theory,for the real labor scenarios of both sides of the game.The realistic labor scenarios of the two sides of the game are used to obtain the payment benefit matrix of both sides.After that,the stability test and parameter analysis of the evolutionary game model are carried out by using the replicated dynamic equation and Jacobi matrix,and the numerical simulation is carried out by MATLAB on this basis.The evolutionary results show that.(1)The initial willingness to cooperate,the dynamic incentive strength,the proportion of losses caused by the non-compliant behavior of takeaway workers whose individuals bear,the supervision strength of platform users,and the losses caused by the non-compliance of takeaway workers to their personal reputation can promote the adoption of dynamic incentive strategies by Internet takeaway platforms and the adoption of compliant behavior by the group of takeaway workers.(2)The two factors of reputation loss to the takeaway platform after the non-compliant behavior of the takeaway workers and the additional benefit gained by the non-compliant behavior of the takeaway workers have a negative relationship on the enhancement of the adoption of labor cooperation strategy by both sides of the game.(3)The existence of optimal user supervision and the proportion of personal responsibility for the damage caused by the non-compliance of the takeaway staff can make the cooperation probability and rate of both parties reach the highest.Combining the results of game model evolution,this paper proposes that the leading role of Internet take-out platforms in flexible labor market regulation should be given full play,and policy recommendations such as establishing a sound flexible labor market regulation system standard should be established to promote labor cooperation between platform enterprises and take-out workers and reduce unreasonable labor pressures on the group of take-out workers due to platform competition.This study provides a new idea for the construction of flexible labor market supervision system for Internet take-out platform enterprises,which can identify and reduce the development risks caused by unstable factors in the labor process while enhancing social and economic benefits. |
