Research On The Impact Of Equity Pledge Of Yingfang's Controlling Shareholder On Audit Opinion Purchas

With the increasing development of the capital market,equity pledge,as a new way of financing,is pursued by more and more enterprises.Equity pledge means that the controlling shareholder mortgages his equity to the bank to obtain loans or provide guarantee for loans to a third party.Compared with other loan methods,equity pledge has the advantages of low operation threshold,simpler procedure and low cost.Most of them are adopted by small and medium-sized board and gem enterprises to solve the problem of capital turnover.Because these companies are small,lack of collateral and no guarantee provided by the government,they have limited access to capital.Frequent equity pledge will have a bad impact on the company itself and its shares.Once the market plummets,the stock price will fall to the warning line or closing line.In order to protect their own interests,when the stock falls to the closing line,the controlling shareholder cannot make up the position and add collateral.The pledgee has the right to dispose of the stock in his hand,and the controlling shareholder will lose the control of the stock.In order to prevent the loss of equity,the controlling shareholders will take a series of methods.Among them,the controlling shareholders can maintain the stability of the company by manipulating the external information disclosure and disclosing good news to external investors.Then the controlling shareholders can transmit good information to the outside by purchasing audit opinions.It can be observed from the existing literature that most of the research on the equity pledge of controlling shareholders focuses on the economic consequences,and there is little research on the impact of the equity pledge of controlling shareholders on the behavior of enterprises.Moreover,the existing research on the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on audit opinion purchase mainly draws conclusions through empirical analysis,but lacks the exploration of practical cases,so this thesis analyzes and studies through specific cases.Firstly,it summarizes the relevant research status of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and audit opinion purchase.On this basis,it defines the related concepts of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and audit opinion purchase.Based on principal-agent theory,signal asymmetry theory,contract theory and audit collusion theory,this thesis analyzes the influence mechanism of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on audit opinion purchase.Then,the case company introduces the equity pledge of Yingfang’s controlling shareholder;Then introduce Yingfang company as a specific case study object to analyze the impact of Yingfang’s controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the purchase of audit opinions through the decline of accounting information quality and the risk path of control right transfer.It is found that Yingfang purchases audit opinions by changing accounting firms,changing auditors and paying abnormal audit fees;The equity pledge of the controlling shareholder of Yingfang company will affect the purchase of audit opinions through the decline of the quality of accounting information and the risk path of control transfer.The conclusion enriches the research on the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the behavior of listed companies,expands the analysis perspective of the influencing factors of enterprise audit opinion purchase behavior,and provides theoretical reference and support for the decision-making analysis of regulators and the development of related work.