Research On The Influence Of The Private Interest Motivation Of Major Shareholders On The Irrational Charitable Donation Of Enterprises

With the development of the domestic economy,the plan to improve income inequality through the three distribution pattern has been put on the agenda,among which corporate philanthropy as the third distribution has received increasing attention.However,the charitable donation of listed enterprises is not entirely motivated by altruism.It may also be that the decision-making level of the enterprise is motivated by self-interest when making decisions and exchanges corporate wealth for personal benefits.In the long run,it will undermine the confidence of investors in the capital market and is not conducive to the healthy development of corporate charitable donation culture.At the same time,in the domestic capital market environment,there are often serious principal-agent conflicts between controlling shareholders and other shareholders.The specific decision of corporate charitable donation is made and implemented by the major shareholders with decision-making power through the internal bureaucratic system of the company,rather than the listed enterprise as a whole organization,which makes charitable donation not only an organizational behavior,but also a mixture of the individual wishes and demands of "insiders" of listed enterprises.Under this background,this paper conducts research to explore the impact of the shareholding ratio of major shareholders of listed enterprises on irrational charitable donations of enterprises and the impact of regional marketization on the correlation between the above two.On this basis,it explores whether the introduction of institutional investors and the independent director system can effectively curb the self-interest motivation of major shareholders of listed enterprises.Compared with previous studies,this paper focuses on examining the impact of large shareholders’ self-interest motives on corporate irrational charitable donations and its practical mechanism.At the same time,most of the existing literatures regard corporate philanthropic donations as a whole for research,and rarely deal with philanthropic donations separately.However,this paper effectively identifies the rational and irrational components of corporate philanthropic donations,which makes it possible to recognize and affirm the impact of corporate strategic motivation on philanthropic donations while analyzing the impact of internal personnel’s selfish motivation on corporate philanthropic donations.The research of this paper can be divided into three parts.The first part summarizes the motivation and consequences of corporate philanthropic donations and the impact of major shareholders on corporate philanthropic donations by combing the relevant literature at home and abroad in the early stage,and establishes relevant hypotheses on the basis of this theory.The second part,model construction and empirical analysis.This paper selects the data of listed companies from 2009 to 2020 as samples,uses the value variables of listed companies to measure the rational and irrational parts of corporate charitable donations,and combines the characteristics of variables,selects the Tobit model for regression analysis to test the relevant hypotheses about the impact of large shareholders’ selfish motives on corporate irrational charitable donations.In this part,this paper analyzes the heterogeneity from the perspective of property right attributes,and analyzes the robustness by replacing the explained variables and the measurement method of explanatory variables.The third part,research conclusions and policy recommendations.The corresponding conclusions and relevant policy recommendations are summarized according to the regression results.This paper finds the following conclusions:1.whether in the listed enterprises with high or low shareholding ratio of large shareholders,with the rise of control rights of large shareholders,they will more embezzle the assets of enterprises through charitable donations,that is,conduct tunneling.2.The degree of marketization of the region where the listed enterprise is located will negatively regulate the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of the enterprise.3.By introducing institutional investors or establishing an independent director system,listed enterprises can,to a certain extent,curb the tunneling behavior of large shareholders.According to the research conclusion,this paper puts forward the following suggestions:the internal control system of listed companies should be further adjusted,the ownership structure of enterprises should be improved,the checks and balances of large shareholder groups should be achieved,and the situation of one dominant shareholder in the governance structure should be reduced;In addition,to improve the laws and regulations on institutional investors and independent directors is also to improve the internal governance mechanism of enterprises;Finally,regulating information circulation can control the operation of listed enterprises in a timely manner.Regulators should standardize the information disclosure system of listed enterprises and improve the liquidity of information.