Research On The System Of Shareholders Exercising The Right Of Inspection In Parent Companie

The exercise of shareholders’ inspection rights as a basic right within shareholders’ right to know is the foundation for realizing other rights.In the context of group company structures,there is an urgent need for parent company shareholders to exercise inspection rights across subsidiaries.However,in the absence of relevant legal provisions,the expansion of these rights may disrupt the existing power structure and balance of interests.This paper discusses the practical need for parent company shareholders to exercise inspection rights across subsidiaries by exploring the theoretical analysis,legitimacy analysis,dilemma balance,foreign legislation and practice,and design of the inspection right crossing path in China,providing theoretical support and rule design for the exercise of shareholder inspection rights across subsidiaries.The first part,the theoretical analysis of the cross-exercise of the right of inspection by shareholders of the parent company,mainly involves the establishment of shareholder inspection needs,the discussion of group law and related concepts of parent-subsidiary companies,and the legitimacy analysis of the cross-exercise of shareholder inspection rights in China,including inspection rights Cross theory,legal person personality denial theory,control domination theory,another self-subject theory.In the parent-subsidiary company structure,the cross-exercise of shareholder inspection rights at different levels is of great significance for protecting shareholder interests.In this process,the relevant provisions of group law are particularly important for protecting and balancing the interests of all parties.The second part,the practical needs and difficulties of cross-exercise of inspection rights in China,including cross-exercise of shareholder inspection rights and director fiduciary obligations and subsidiary company trade secrets and conflicts with subsidiary company legal person personality independence.This part will discuss these theories in depth and evaluate possible conflicts of interest to provide theoretical support for the system of cross-exercise of shareholder inspection rights in China.The third part takes Delaware as an example to explore the practice and implications of cross-border inspection rights across different levels,including Delaware’s rulings with and without legal provisions and their implications for China.By comparing Delaware’s legislation and practice,this paper will provide useful reference for the rule design and implementation of the exercise of the right to inspect by shareholders in China.The fourth part discusses the path of the exercise of the right to inspect by parent company shareholders in China,involving the norms of the subject and object of the exercise of the right to inspect across different levels,the conditions for parent company shareholders to exercise the right to inspect across different levels,and the legal provisions of the system of the right to inspect across different levels.This part will discuss the subject and object of the exercise of the right to inspect across different levels,the conditions for exercising,and the legal provisions,providing operational suggestions for the exercise of the right to inspect by parent company shareholders in China.For example,clarifying the subject of the exercise of the right to inspect across different levels should classify parent company shareholders,and the object should cover relevant information of the subsidiary company;setting reasonable exercise conditions,such as equity ratio,inspection purpose,information confidentiality,etc.;and improving the legal provisions of the exercise of the right to inspect across different levels to safeguard shareholder interests while preventing potential conflicts of interest.This paper aims to provide a theoretical basis,reasonable rule design,and solutions for the exercise of parent company shareholders’ right to inspect across layers in order to balance the interests of various parties and promote the healthy development of the company law system.In practice,attention should be paid to the legitimate interests of parent company shareholders,perfecting legal provisions and institutional design to prevent the exercise of shareholders’ right to inspect across layers from disrupting the original power structure and interest balance,while drawing on foreign experience to continuously improve and develop China’s company law system.