A Game Study On Settlement Of Extreme Controversy Over Land Expropriation Compensation Under Fair Preference

In the process of farmland expropriation and compensation,the newly revised Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China has improved the compensation standard for land-lost farmers,and ensured their right through the preemptive compensation procedure.However,due to the different interest demands,it is difficult to reach a consensus on the compensation scheme.Local governments,collective economic organizations and farmers have almost contradictory standards of fairness and almost different preferences for fairness among public interests,collective interests and individual interests,which give rise to extreme differences in interest cognition and judgment.In the extreme belief interaction between local governments,collective economic organizations and farmers and the expectation of polarized compensation,the "veil of ignorance" type of extreme controversy,the "intergenerational distributive justice" type of extreme controversy,the "weapon of the weak" type of extreme controversy are formed.Based on MATLAB numerical simulation to verify the analysis results of the extreme dispute game model,this paper concludes the following research conclusions.First,in the "veil of ignorance" extreme controversy,when the collective economic organization’s farmland expropriation compensation is negatively correlated with the local government’s incentive equity preference,that is,the stronger the local government’s incentive equity preference,the better the collective economic organization and the farmers’ equity.The lower the compensation for farmland expropriation.Second,in the extreme controversy of "intergenerational distribution justice",when a small proportion of the collective economic organization contributes to the compensation for the expropriation of farmland,the stronger the intergenerational fairness preference of the collective economic organization,the less compensation for the expropriation of farmland allocated to farmers.However,when the collective economic organization provides a large proportion of the compensation for farmland expropriation,the stronger the collective economic organization’s preference for intergenerational fairness,the more compensation for farmland expropriation it is willing to allocate to farmers.Third,in the “weapons of the weak” type of extreme controversy,the lower the compensation for farmland expropriation the farmers receive,the stronger the farmers’ preference for fair outcomes.Although local governments,collective economic organizations and farmers have almost different fairness preferences,they all aim to narrow the income gap between themselves and other stakeholders as much as possible.Based on the above conclusions,the path to resolve extreme controversy over farmland expropriation and compensation needs to be comprehensively considered from the aspects of strengthening the role of compensation subjects,satisfying the fair preference of multiple compensation subjects,and increasing the fairness and openness of the compensation process.Local governments,collective economic organizations and farmers have almost different preferences for fairness,but all of them aim to narrow the benefit gap between themselves and other interest subjects.Therefore,the path to resolve extreme controversy over compensation for agricultural land acquisition requires strengthening the role of compensation subjects,satisfying the fairness preferences of multiple compensation subjects,and increasing the fairness and openness of the compensation process.