Research On Competitive Harm In Data-driven Mergers And Acquisitions

Mergers and acquisitions(M&A)are a common way of consolidating resources,but such rapid expansion can also lead to drastic changes in the market structure and cause disorderly competition.Pre-emptive review rules are an ex-ante prevention of the attempts that may create or strengthen potential market power,maintain a rational market structure and prevent excessive concentration of market power.The disruptive technologies and innovations that have emerged since the digital revolution have led to a consensus on the advent of the so-called "digital economy",while technological developments have changed communications and business strategies into more focusing on innovation and data.Chapter 1 discusses the rise and the risks of data-driven M&A.Since most of the target companies that the Internet companies tend to acquire are in their infancy and have not yet generated sufficient turnover to meet the legal merger notification thresholds,such mergers may escape the scrutiny of antitrust regulators.It can be seen that the traditional approach currently used by antitrust regulators has limitations facing data-driven M&A,so the price itself should no longer be the only concern and mechanism for antitrust regulators,and the competitive analysis of M&A must include non-price aspects of competition,such as quality,variety and innovation.Chapter 2 discusses the issues of personal information protection,data governance and the regulation of chokehold mergers are emerging as new challenges for competition damage analysis.With regard to the alienation and integration of personal information issues and merger control,the paper develops the debate on the relevance of personal information protection to competition enforcement and whether competition law can intervene in the jurisdiction.On the regulatory dilemma of chokehold mergers,the paper discusses the nature of chokehold mergers and the conflict between corporate autonomy and competitive harm.Chapters 3 and 4 provide an in-depth analysis of whether and how these two factors should be incorporated into the logic of competitive harm assessment in competition analysis from the perspectives of privacy harm and innovation harm respectively,and attempt to propose new ideas on the use of data governance norms to achieve competition regulatory effects,comprehensive assessment of "choke zones",and proper application of efficiency defenses and public interest principles.There is still a great deal of controversy about the implications of such mergers and acquisitions and how to analyze and judge the true intentions and potential competitive harm.In contrast,a better way of thinking is to build on the traditional analytical framework,weighing up the two new issues,weighing up the methodological feasibility and the cost of enforcement "mistakes",and complementing the existing regime.Guided by this approach,the paper discusses and designs possible solutions to the two salient issues in data-driven M&A,which should provide some reference for relevant practice.