A Differential Game Research On The Integration Of Data Resources Between Local Governments And Enterprises Under Central Government Subsidies

In the era of digital economy,data has become an important factor of production.The transformation and upgrading of traditional industries,the construction of new smart cities and digital governments are highly related to the integration and application of government and enterprise data resources.The application value of government and enterprise data resources and the integration of data resources between governments and enterprises have received great attention from all walks of life.National data sharing and exchange system consists of two parts: the state and the local government,and the central government has taken corresponding measures to promote the integration of data resources between local governments and enterprises,but the integration and circulation of data resources between local governments and enterprises is not enough,the willingness of enterprises to integrate data resources with local governments is not strong and the level of data resources integration between governments and enterprises is not high,and it is difficult to play the key elements of data,which has a great impact on the development of digital economy.It is urgent to accelerate the promotion of local governments.Therefore,under the premise of central government subsidies,this paper applies differential game theory to study the integration of local government and enterprise data resources and the central government’s subsidy strategy,as follows:The first is to use the central government subsidy rate as an exogenous variable to construct a game model between local governments and enterprises,and to study from a long-term dynamic framework how local governments and enterprises design contracts under subsidies from the central government to encourage both parties to increase data resource integration.The second is to carry out research on the mechanism of revenue sharing,to promote local governments and enterprises to ensure the stability of the behavior strategies of local governments and enterprises under the condition of collaborative cooperation and bilateral cost-sharing contracts under the premise of exogenous variables of the central government subsidy rate.The third is to expand the central government subsidy rate as a control variable,build a tripartite game model with the central government,local governments,and enterprises as the main body,and further study the optimal subsidy rate of the central government and the optimal strategy for local governments and enterprises to integrate data resources.Through the above research,it is found that:(1)When the central government subsidy rate is an exogenous variable,in the case of collaborative cooperation and the introduction of bilateral cost-sharing contracts,the benefits of local governments and enterprises and the level of data resource integration achieve Pareto optimality,and the benefit coordination mechanism designed in the above two situations can ensure the stability of the behavior strategies of both sides of the game.(2)When the central government subsidy rate is a control variable,the model and simulation results show that the central government subsidy rate is different and fixed in the three situations of Nash non-cooperation,Stackelberg master-slave game,and cooperative cooperation game,and does not change with time.It is related to the game mode and game status between local governments and enterprises.(3)When the subsidy rate of the central government is a control variable,the subsidy behavior of the central government can change the strategies and benefits of local governments and enterprises in the traditional three game situations.Local governments and enterprises can choose strategies to integrate data resources from the perspective of maximizing their own interests,which is more in line with the actual situation and has certain practical guiding significance.