Research On The Improvement Of My Country's Corporate Bondholders' Meeting Syste

Since China’s economy entered the "new normal",the economic growth potential has decreased,and the GDP growth rate has dropped accordingly.Macroscopically,the coverage level and ability of economic growth to debt principal and interest are also weakening.At the micro level,with the economic downturn,the prosperity of economic entities has decreased,and the business operation has deteriorated to varying degrees.With the economic slowdown and increasing financing pressure,bond default and credit risk exposure accelerate in the domestic credit market.It is the general trend to break the rigid exchange of credit bonds,and the issuance management of bonds is bound to face stricter supervision and law enforcement.Bond investors have an increasing demand to reduce losses and safeguard their own interests through relevant rules.At present,the practice of trustee and bondholder meeting implemented in China still needs to be improved.When bond default continues to break out,the new securities law has written the bondholder meeting system into law,indicating the firm attitude of the regulators to build a dual governance mechanism of bondholder meeting and bond trustee and improve the mechanism to protect the rights and interests of investors.As an imported product from the civil law system,the bondholder meeting system has taken root in various bond business rules,but the protection system itself needs to be further improved.The system still has some defects,such as low legal rank,insufficient binding force,single voting mechanism and insufficient protection of dissenting holders.These defects lead to problems in varying degrees,such as the inability to convene the meeting in time and the inability to effectively implement the resolutions of the meeting.This paper points out the problems that the bondholder meeting system should be further improved from three aspects: the role conflict of intermediaries,the defects of proceedings and the relief of dissenting holders,in order to summarize the results,experience and lessons in the past practice,and provide feasible suggestions for promoting the effective implementation of the bondholder meeting system and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of investors.The first chapter of this paper will analyze the goal,function and value of the bondholder association system,and explain its specific structure and legal rank.Through the characteristics of the conference system in China’s practice,this paper leads to the defects and suggestions in the three systems that will be mainly analyzed below.This chapter is divided into two parts.The first part summarizes and introduces the background and structure of China’s bondholder meeting system.This paper first expounds the main role of the bondholder meeting system,then discusses the implementation of the system in China,and finally introduces the evolution and application of the system in the past legal system in China’s investor protection mechanism.The second part is a general introduction to the three main problems faced by the bondholder meeting system in China’s investor protection,and a general description of the problems.The second chapter will focus on the improvement of bondholders’ meeting procedures."Robert’s rules of procedure" is a set of standardized and operational tools,and a set of unified and complete rules of procedure.Through the comparison and reference of the existing bondholders’ meeting procedures and the value theory of "Robert’s rules of procedure",this chapter will put forward some suggestions on the reform of the meeting procedures and rules,including the convening of the meeting,the voting mechanism and the neutrality of the convener.The third chapter mainly analyzes how to effectively connect the bondholder meeting system and the trustee system.In domestic practice,as the trustee,it undertakes the work of bond declaration,issuance and later supervision,spans the whole process of bond from generation to termination,and represents the interests of the issuer at this stage.At the same time,the trustee also plays an important role in the bondholders’ meeting,responsible for convening,presiding over and implementing resolutions,and representing the interests of investors at this stage.This chapter will take the fiduciary duty of the trustee,the setting of reward and punishment system and the constraints of internal risk isolation as the main scheme,and put forward suggestions on how to effectively complement the trustee system and the bondholders.The fourth chapter will be divided into three chapters to analyze the lack of objection holder protection system in China.Starting from the analysis of the disadvantages of the "majority decision" system,this paper puts forward the importance of the protection of dissenting holders.In one section,by analyzing the current situation and cases of domestic abuse of voting rights,this paper expounds the reasonable limits of the protection of dissenting holders,including the conflict between the effectiveness of meeting resolutions and the individual litigation rights of dissenting holders,as well as the concession scale of the protection of dissenting holders.The second section describes the current protection methods of dissent holders in China.The third section puts forward suggestions on the relief methods of dissenting holders,and puts forward a more practical and feasible relief scheme for dissenting holders in combination with the common protection means for dissenting holders in international practice-hierarchical voting system and giving dissenting holders the right to revoke.