A Study On The Delay Of South Korea’s Decision To Recover Wartime Operational Control

Graham Allison initially focused on the U.S.diplomatic decision-making during the Cuban missile Crisis.He used three models to analyze the relevant elements involved in the process of U.S.diplomatic decision-making,namely,"rational actor model","organizational behavior model" and "governmental politics model".Under the rational actor model,the country is the symbol of rationality,and the decision is naturally made to conform to its national interests to some extent.The organizational actor is an important part of the state actor,and interests and principles of the organization also affect the decision-making.Government bureaucrats are actual participants and makers of the foreign policy.And their power,status and political ideas directly affect the decision-making.It was based on these three models that the U.S.government did not make the decision to launch a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.Therefore,Allison’s decision-making models have important reference value in analyzing the key variables that affect a country’s foreign policy decision-making and finding out the nature of decision-making.The issue of operational control is an issue left over from Korean history.It is not only an important issue between South Korea and the United States,but also an significant issue that Korean academics continue to discuss.After taking back peacetime operational control in 1994,South Korea and the United States officially agreed to transfer wartime operational control in February 2007 under the auspices of the Roh Moo Hyun administration.However,the Lee Myung Bak administration and Park Geun Hye administration delayed the recovery process in 2010 and 2014 respectively.In 2017,it was not until Moon Jae-in took office that South Korea expressed its intention to recover wartime operational control once again.But this issue was subject to various factors,and eventually South Korea has not achieved obvious results in the recovery of wartime operational control.According to the analysis of Allison decision models,as a rational state actor,South Korea needs to safeguard its own national interests.Because it is faced with complex security environment,including the North Korean nuclear and missile issue,the United States’ security strategies and the influence of China-US strategic competition,which directly restrict the formulation and formation of wartime operational control decision.As an important organizational actor in South Korea,the military has a direct interest in the issue of wartime operational control,and its attitude and stance are crucial.The president of South Korea has direct decision-making power on the return of wartime operational control,and their decisions depend on some security considerations respectively.When South Korea is faced with the nuclear threat of North Korea,the change of the security strategy of the United States,the stubborn conservative military organization and the conservative president,president Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye tend to delay the decision to recover wartime operational control.When it is faced with the complicated international relations on the Korean Peninsula,the military’s conservative nature and the progressive president,President Moon Jae-in is inclined to actively recover wartime operational control.But the result is recognised as a substantial delay.Thus,it can be seen that whether to make a decision to withdraw or to delay the transfer of wartime operational control directly depends on the decision of the president,but the transfer of wartime operational control still essentially depends on whether problems involved in the level of rational actors and organizational actors are solved,that is,South Korea must meet the ability to grasp wartime operational control to cope with the changing security environment.In addition,the issue of the transfer of wartime operational control also depends on the attitude of the United States and the opinions of the Korean people.