Research On Government Incentive And Supervision Of Mega Construction Projects Under Information Asymmetry

Mega construction projects are an important cornerstone of China’s economic development and social stability.However,as the investment scale of mega construction projects increases and the technical complexity increases,it is easy to lead to cost overruns,delayed construction schedules,project corruption,lack of government supervision,stakeholders conflict and other problems.These problems have seriously affected the economic and social functions of mega construction projects.Mega construction projects are usually constructed by the government as the main body of investment.Because of its political status,legitimacy,authority and strong ability to integrate social resources,the government becomes the core subject leading decision-making affairs in the decision-making process of mega construction projects.The government,as the actual owner,is responsible for the construction management of the project,and then entrusts the actual work of the project construction to the contractor,and entrusts the supervision of the contractor to the supervisor.However,the principal-agent relationship between government,contractor and supervision unit leads to information asymmetry,which may lead to moral hazard behavior.In order to better promote the success of the project,the government generally plays the dual role of incentive and supervisor in the project construction.However,the existing research has not done a good research on the incentive and supervision behavior of mega construction projects from the dual roles of the government.This paper focuses on the government’s incentive and supervision of mega construction projects.Based on the assumptions of completely rational subjects and bounded rational subjects respectively,this paper analyzes the government’s incentive and supervision strategies from static and dynamic perspectives.The incentive of mega construction projects is essentially an incentive-compatible model based on principal-agent theory.By taking the corresponding incentive measures,the project agent and the principal are promoted to achieve the same goal,and the project agent is encouraged to work hard and jointly promote the success of the project.The supervision of mega construction projects is essentially to consider the strategic choice of the core stakeholders of mega construction projects.The government supervises possible opportunistic behaviors to maximize project performance and better play the functions of mega construction projects.Firstly,based on the characteristics of mega construction projects,the government,contractor and supervisor are taken as the research subjects to consider the behavior choice logic of the three.Secondly,based on the assumption of completely rational subjects,the incentive compatibility model between the core stakeholders of mega construction projects aiming at output and overall income is constructed from a static perspective,and then through the model solution,a reasonable incentive coefficient is set to maximize the performance output,so that the government can realize the role function of the incentive.Thirdly,based on the assumption of bounded rational subjects,the evolutionary game model of dynamic supervision during the construction period of mega construction projects is constructed.Then,by analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies of each core subject and the evolution results of the tripartite game system,the equilibrium state under different conditions is explored.Finally,based on the constructed evolutionary game model of mega construction project supervision,two software,VENSIM PLE and MATLAB R2015 B,are used to numerically simulate the operation process of the tripartite evolutionary game model,to verify the evolutionary equilibrium state,and to compare and analyze the influence mechanism of incentive supervision parameters and other factors on the strategy selection of the core subject of mega construction projects.By adjusting the changes of corresponding parameters to make the project develop in a good direction and then make the government realize the role function of the regulator.The conclusions are drawn and reasonable suggestions are provided for the government’s incentive and supervision measures.