Under the background of current economic transformation and structural upgrading,effectively encouraging high-tech enterprises to invest in R&D can enhance the core strength of enterprises and change the growth mode of GDP.As a regulatory tool,government subsidy plays a strong role in promoting r&d investment and technological innovation of high-tech enterprises,but the effect and mechanism of this policy on r&d investment are controversial.At the same time,the government subsidy policy belongs to the government’s intervention in the market by administrative means.The government has a large decision-making power in resource sharing,and rent-seeking corruption may occur in the process of resource allocation,affecting the effectiveness of the policy.Therefore,this thesis focuses on the influence of corruption,providing theoretical and empirical support for enterprises’ R&D activities decision-making and relevant national policy making.Based on the above views,this thesis firstly analyzes the current situation of corruption,government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment in China by combining with the latest data,and analyzes the reasons restricting the level of enterprise R&D investment.Secondly,using the rent-seeking theory,principal-agent theory and information asymmetry and signaling theory to analyze the mechanism of action of enterprise r&d subsidies,corruption,suppression of the causes and mechanism of enterprise r&d environment and affected by the degree of corruption,government subsidies to inhibit the action of the enterprise r&d input mechanism and corresponding hypotheses are proposed.Then,this thesis takes the annual report data of high-tech enterprises such as manufacturing industry and information technology service industry from 2016 to 2020 as the research object,empirically tests the influence and effect of corruption and government subsidy policy on enterprise R&D investment by using the two-step model of panel data.The full sample data,ownership nature sample data and subsidy scale sample data are empirically tested and analyzed.Finally,this thesis deeply studies the influence mechanism of corruption and government R&D subsidies on enterprises’ R&D investment,and provides reasonable suggestions for the government to implement "precise policies".The results show that :(1)the degree of corruption has a significant negative impact on r&d investment of enterprises,and the nature of property rights can moderate the relationship between corruption and r&d investment of enterprises,that is,compared with state-owned enterprises,corruption has a higher degree of inhibition on r&d investment of non-state-owned enterprises;(2)To a certain extent,government subsidies can improve the R&D input of enterprises,but with the increase of government subsidy intensity,the promotion effect will weaken,that is,the effect of government subsidies on enterprise R&D input is inverted U-shaped;(3)The degree of corruption will inhibit the promotion effect of government subsidies on enterprise R&D investment,and the higher the degree of corruption,the more obvious the inhibition effect.Based on the above findings,the following suggestions are proposed:The government and relevant departments should improve the subsidy review and supervision mechanism,establish and perfect the intellectual property system;And to increase the punishment and supervision of corruption activities,improve the comprehensive law enforcement system;Enterprises should strengthen the ability to resist risks and form their own competitive advantages while carrying out technological innovation. |