Against Religious Doctrinal Exclusivism

To respond to the religious diversity,religious doctrinal exclusivism claims that only the doctrines of the home religion are true,and the incompatible doctrines of other religions are false.Exclusivists attempt to seek evidence to support their claim,relying on two types of evidence:religious experiences and philosophical arguments.Opponents of exclusivism argue that exclusivists should not only focus on religious experiences and philosophical arguments belonging to first-order evidence but also consider higher-order evidence that reveals the features of the first-order evidence.They argue that even if first-order evidence is not directly examined for its adequacy,examining higher-order evidence can show whether the first-order evidence is persuasive.Therefore,opponents construct two arguments against exclusivism using higher-order evidence.The first is the debunking argument,which exposes that believers’ belief in religious doctrines comes from irrelevant influences rather than evidence,so all religious doctrines are false.The second is the conciliationism argument,which states that in cases of peer disagreement,exclusivists should suspend their judgment in light of their epistemic peers.Based on these two arguments,opponents claim that exclusivists must at least admit that the doctrinal of the home religion are not more true than those of their epistemic peers.In response to the threat posed by higher-order evidence,exclusivists have also launched a counterattack.They argue that higher-order evidence is not enough to undermine first-order evidence and that the inter-religious disagreement is not peer disagreements.In discussing whether higher-order evidence is enough to undermine first-order evidence,Thomas Kelly argues that the weakening of high-order evidence is ineffective when the given first-order evidence actually favors the original belief.In addition,some commentators argue that under ideal epistemic conditions,higher-order evidence will conflict with rational epistemic rules.Therefore,it is best to abandon the higher-order evidence.In discussing whether inter-religious disagreement are peer disagreements,exclusivists argue that adherents have private religious experiences that make them unable to satisfy the concept of epistemic peers.This article will defend the opponents’ position against exclusivism and respond to the counterattack by exclusivists,arguing that their counterattack is ineffective.Firstly,the article will show that Thomas Kelly’s argument is not persuasive because it begs the question.Secondly,the article argues that even if we acknowledge that under ideal epistemic conditions,higher-order evidence conflicts with rational epistemic rules,we should not deny the effect of higher-order evidence under non-ideal epistemic conditions.Furthermore,the article does not presuppose that inter-religious disagreement are under ideal epistemic conditions.Finally,the article argues that even though private religious experiences cannot be shared by others,this does not prevent exclusivists and their competitors from being epistemic peers.Furthermore,the article shares methods that can make private religious experiences public.Therefore,the article will reiterate the opponents’ position that exclusivists must at least admit that the doctrines of the home religion are no truer than those of their epistemic peers.