| The semantic separability of one thing from another means that the definition or interpretation of the former does not rely on the latter;The ontological separability of one thing from another means that the existence of the former does not depend on the latter.Block argues that“Consciousness”is a mongrel concept that can be divided into at least two types: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness.This distinction is both a semantic conclusion and an ontological conclusion.Conceptually,the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness can be independently distinguished;On ontology,there are factual cases that support separability.This paper refutes Block’s theory of consciousness in terms of the criterion of phenomenal consciousness.First of all,it is argued that there is a dilemma in separating phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness.If unconscious psychological representations cannot be counted as phenomenal consciousness,then the independent existence of phenomenal consciousness faces methodological difficulties.The proposition of “ having phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness ” is wrong;If unconscious psychological representations can be counted as phenomenal consciousness,they will face problems such as internal conceptual incoherence,pan-consciousness traps,and the decline of psychological attributes.That is,overly generalized phenomenal consciousness is empty.In addition,Block’s claim that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness have non overlapping neural matrices is problematic from empirical evidence.Secondly,it is argued that the existence of access consciousness is facing a logical dilemma when it is separated from phenomenal consciousness.If we do not accept that access consciousness is based on phenomenal consciousness,we need to accept that pure information processing computers are also conscious,which constitutes a contradiction to Block’s early anti functionalist claims;If the acceptance of access consciousness is based on phenomenal consciousness,the independent existence of access consciousness is logically untenable,because the existence of access consciousness already indicates the existence of phenomenal consciousness as its foundation.Thirdly,it expounds the indivisibility of the two types of consciousness,which stems from the existence of an analytical or a priori connection between the concept of phenomenal consciousness and the concept of access consciousness.So far,there is no reliable separable case to support the ontological separation of the two types of consciousness concepts.According to the author’s argument,it is concluded that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are two categories of the same object,and the substantive separability is not proved. |
