A Study Of The Imputation Problem In Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Can freedom under the interpretation of the principle of autonomy be used to account for violations of moral law? This problem has always been a very concerned problem in the study of Kant’s moral philosophy and has caused many related discussions.In modern times,it has been highlighted as a moral imputation problem: Since Kant interprets freedom as autonomy,freedom means that we do act in accordance with self-legislation.However,when we violate the moral law,the immoral behavior we do is not out of autonomy but heteronomy,so it is not free.But the moral imputation must be based on freedom,so the behavior that violates the moral law becomes non-accountable.I will start from the scholars’ discussion and different views on this issue,and try to re-examine the "imputation problem" here based on Kant’s own thought.In the first chapter,we introduce the origin of this "imputation problem" and some existing solutions.The question was first presented,by its two authors,as a suspected contradiction within Kantian moral philosophy between the culpability of acts that violate moral law and the fact that a autonomous will will follow the moral law thoroughly.But at the same time,in people’s discussion of this issue,it is further manifested as the contradiction between two kinds of freedom,namely the freedom as autonomy and the freedom of choosing good and evil.Some scholars believe that the latter kind of freedom is the "arbitrary freedom" said by Kant.Accordingly,we have divided the existing solutions to the "problem of imputation" into three main categories,based on different understandings of the relationship between these two views of freedom,and have presented and analysed each of them.In the second chapter,in order to make clear the meaning and relationship between the two concepts of arbitrary freedom and autonomy of practical reason,to do an outline of Kant’s theory of freedom.We will make a detailed analysis of the concepts of "transcendental freedom","practical freedom","will","arbitrary freedom" and "autonomy of practical reason".By linking them together,we can directly show a clear main line of Kant’s theory of freedom.The pure metaphysical concept of transcendental freedom reserves ground for the possibility of practical freedom.The practical freedom needs to obtain its reality through the will;A free will manifests itself in the human being as a liberal arbitrariness,and the human’s arbitrary freedom is based on the principle of autonomy.This is the derivation path to be adopted in the analysis of this chapter.From which we can understand that Kant’s view of freedom is always consistent,that is,there are no two different interpretation principles of freedom,and arbitrary freedom is by no means a choice ability to choose good or evil.The basis for arbitrariness being free is still defined by the principle of autonomy.In the third chapter,we first draw a conclusion about the relation between arbitrary freedom and the autonomy of practical reason.From the perspective of moral metaphysics,the existing freedom in human beings only refers to arbitrary freedom,and autonomy provides the basis for arbitrary freedom as an explanatory principle.From the perspective of teleology,arbitrary freedom is only the unrealised autonomous freedom.As a potential,autonomy is the purpose of our arbitrariness,and autonomous freedom is the complete realization of arbitrary freedom.Thus a preliminary answer to the "imputation problem" can be given: Our acts contrary to the moral law are also free,for they are arise out of arbitrary freedom,and though it is a heteronomy that determines our arbitrariness in this act,autonomy always provides arbitrary freedom with a supreme principle,which not only gives it its definition,but also gives it practical reality.Therefore,acts that violate the moral law are still governed by the principle of autonomous freedom and can therefore be imputed to the agent.In order to get a more thorough answer,we will also delve into the interior of the rational origin of the "imputation problem",and in the second section of Chapter 3,We will make a prerequisite critique of the problem itself.Here we find a kind of antinomy about practical freedom and analyze the contradictions among them,from which we realize that all the contradictions in the problem are essentially derived from the dialectics of practical reason,that is,the contradiction of reason itself.So in the third section,we will draw on the question "Why are people free to act against the laws of reason?" to discusses the contradiction within reason,and finally explores the way to completely solve this contradiction through Kant’s idea of natural intention.