Share Repurchase Under Continuous Equity Pledge Of Wanfengaowei:A Study On The Usurpation Of Major Shareholders’ Interests

At present,equity pledge has become a common financing method for the controlling shareholders of listed companies,but the uncertainty of stock price makes the controlling shareholders may face the risk of equity pledge at any time.In this regard,the controlling shareholder will ask the company to implement share repurchase to help alleviate the risk of equity pledge,but not all companies can benefit from the implementation of share repurchase.If the major shareholder still uses the control right to ask the company to implement share repurchase to help alleviate the risk of equity pledge,it will damage the company,which makes share repurchase become a means of interest encroachment by the controlling shareholder.Therefore,how to prevent the controlling shareholder from taking advantage of share repurchase and how to protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders are worth discussing.This paper takes Wanfeng Aowei as the research object,summarizes relevant literature and theories,and comprehensively uses event study method,factor analysis method and EVA value evaluation model.On the basis of analyzing the risk of major shareholders’ equity pledge and the company’s implementation of share repurchase,this paper firstly expounds the identification ideas of major shareholders’ share repurchase benefit encroachment.Secondly,according to the recognition idea,the realization process of the major shareholders’ share repurchase type benefit encroachment is analyzed.Then it makes clear the cause of the major shareholder’s share repurchase type interest encroachment behavior;Then it studies the economic consequences of the major shareholder’s share repurchase type benefit encroachment.Finally,according to the above case analysis results,the research conclusions are drawn and relevant suggestions are put forward from the internal and external perspectives of the company.Combining theory and case analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions: First,the process of major shareholders’ share repurchase benefit embezzlement includes the major shareholders relieving the risk of equity pledge through share repurchase and the major shareholders using the control right to make the company carry out share repurchase without benefit.Second,the major shareholders share repurchase type benefit embezzlement behavior is caused by the defects of corporate internal governance and the failure of corporate external supervision.Third,share repurchase type benefit embezzlement behavior of major shareholders will lead to major shareholders gain profits,have a negative impact on the company,and damage the interests of minority shareholders.In the face of major shareholders’ share repurchase behavior,the company should optimize the ownership structure,prevent "one share dominance",and improve the corporate governance structure.The external supervision department should improve the legal system of share repurchase,strengthen the disclosure mechanism of equity pledge information and enhance the external supervision.