| Based on the theories of market failure and government intervention,principal-agent theory,and information asymmetry theory,this paper investigates the mechanism of action between corporate income tax preferences and corporate investment efficiency.The data of new energy automotive listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2012-2021 are used to explore the impact of corporate income tax preferences on inefficient investment of new energy automotive enterprises using Richardson’s investment efficiency metric model.Meanwhile,this paper divides the sample enterprises into underinvestment group and overinvestment group according to the degree of inefficient investment,and studies the effects of corporate income tax incentives on inefficient investment in these two groups respectively.The interaction term of financing constraint and corporate income tax preference is added to examine the moderating effect of financing constraint on income tax preference and corporate investment efficiency,and the differential impact of income tax preference on investment efficiency under the two different property rights nature of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises is analyzed.After the study,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)the phenomenon of underinvestment generally exists in China’s new energy vehicle enterprises;(2)the corporate income tax preference can effectively alleviate the inefficient investment of the full sample of new energy vehicle enterprises,and the lagged effect of this promotion effect is obvious;(3)the corporate income tax preference can significantly inhibit the underinvestment behavior of the underinvested sample enterprises,but will promote the overinvestment behavior of the overinvested sample(4)financing constraints play a moderating role between the income tax preferences of new energy vehicle enterprises and their investment efficiency;(5)compared with state-owned new energy vehicle enterprises,the income tax preferences enjoyed by non-state-owned new energy vehicle enterprises can better promote their investment efficiency.Based on the results of empirical and theoretical analyses,this paper puts forward the following suggestions for policy reform:(1)it is recommended to improve the legal system of corporate income tax preferences,reduce the proportion of non-legal form policies,and at the same time,clearly target new energy vehicle enterprises for preferences to ensure the stability and authority of new energy vehicle-related policies;(2)it is recommended that for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises with different degrees of financing constraints and(2)It is suggested that differential corporate income tax preferential policies be implemented for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises with different degrees of financing constraints and new energy vehicles with different environmental protection attributes;(3)It is suggested that the income tax preferential policies for new energy vehicle enterprises be optimized in terms of different development stages of new energy vehicles,tax rate settings and R&D expense add-on deduction;(4)It is suggested that the income tax preferential support in financing be increased to provide more financial support for new energy vehicle enterprises. |