Node Pricing And Economic Scheduling Of Distribution Networks Within Peer-to-Peer Energy Market

In recent years,the massive access of distributed renewable energy resources(RESs)to the power system and the in-depth promotion of electricity reform has made the power market open and decentralized.With the rapid development of demand response technology and distributed generators communication technology,passive consumers have transformed into prosumers with source-load duality.The next generation of energy management technology Peer-to-peer(P2P)market become the development trend of electricity market.Compared with the vertical retail market,the decentralized P2 P market improves prosumer autonomy,market efficiency,and renewable energy utilization.However,bilateral trading takes the distribution network as the market carrier,which ignores the distribution network’s physical constraints,which may damage the physical constraints of the distribution network.Furthermore,the uncertainty and randomness of renewable energy units damage the stability and reliability of the distribution network,and the fluctuation penalty curbs the enthusiasm of prosumers to participate in the P2 P market.At the same time,since each prosumer belongs to different stakeholders and the interactive influences of prosumers,the market competition mechanism formed by the bilateral transaction will lead to the conflicting interests of prosumers.In response to the above imperfections,this paper takes the distribution networks P2 P market as the research subjective,focusing on bilateral transaction weight coefficients,distribution network uncertainty management and pricing,market power,and fairness in the distribution of social welfare.The main contents include:(1)A P2 P market mechanism considering physical constraint transaction weight is proposed.The utility model of prosumers and P2 P market clearing mechanism based on bilateral transaction weight coefficients are analyzed.The weight coefficients are analyzed based on the Distflow linearized power flow model and sensitivity coefficient,ensuring strong convexity and market clearing optimality of the optimization problem.Sub-gradient projection method is described to update the weight coefficients,and meanwhile,the alternating direction multiplier method is used to clear the bilateral market.Furthermore,the effectiveness of the weight coefficient in maintaining the security of the distribution system and maximizing the market welfare is demonstrated in the IEEE-69 calculation example.(2)A two-stage P2 P energy market considering uncertainty pricing is proposed.Firstly,coordinate the auxiliary market and P2 P energy market based on optimal social welfare.Use a predictor-corrector proximal multiplier method to clear the first-stage energy market,determining the flexibility adjustment capacity of each prosumer.Next,an ancillary market is designed to manage and price distributed renewable energy uncertainty.The distribution system operator centrally clears ancillary market reserve and determines the distribution locational uncertainty marginal price based on the chance-constrained optimal power flow,ensuring safe operation with a given confidence level.On this basis,a prosumer adjustment utility model is proposed,and the P2 P regulation ability market is constructed.The fast-alternating direction method of multipliers is utilized to clear the regulation ability transaction volume of each prosumer,maximizing the regulation welfare.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed P2 P regulation ability market in reducing the volatility penalty and the uncertainty component transmitted to the main grid is demonstrated in the IEEE-33 system.(3)A P2 P market mechanism considering the fairness of multi-prosumers is proposed.Firstly,according to the market power of each unit of the prosumer,the rational prosumer quotation strategy in the imperfectly competitive P2 P market is analyzed.Next,the market-centric and peer-centric matching mechanisms are proposed.The former focuses on the total social welfare of the P2 P market and uses a distributed algorithm to clear the bilateral contract market to ensure the effectiveness of the P2 P market.The latter focuses on individual market welfare,combines individual market power with price discrimination,and builds the NLeader M-Follower(NLMF)Stackelberg game model.Solve the incentive constraints of each prosumer by deriving the balance of the decision model.Finally,a generalized Nash bargaining model is utilized according to the power clearance under the market-centric mechanism and the incentive constraints under the peercentric mechanism.Scaled form alternating direction method of multipliers is utilized to solve the model to ensure the fairness of the incremental distribution of welfare.The proposed P2 P mechanism follows the principle of incentive compatibility and maximizes social welfare.