| The holding of cash is crucial to the normal operation and future development of an enterprise,and cash,as an asset with strong liquidity in an enterprise,is also the most easy to be seized and transferred.Enterprises usually decide the level of cash holdings according to their actual business needs.What kind of value can be realized by cash will ultimately be reflected in its practical use.In the development process of enterprises,managers and investors usually pay attention to the efficiency of the use of cash assets with strong liquidity,and the value of cash holdings is an important indicator to measure the efficiency and use value of cash assets.In recent years,equity pledge,as an important financing method for controlling shareholders of enterprises,has had an impact on the utilization of corporate cash resources.Equity pledge not only brings a large amount of cash flow to enterprises and alleviates financing constraints,but also has certain risks.In the real market environment,the embezzlement and abuse of corporate funds by the controlling shareholders of listed companies are common.Although China has a strict market supervision mechanism,the controlling shareholders will still engage in illegal appropriation of funds in pursuit of the maximization of personal interests,resulting in the phenomenon of "tunneling".A large number of studies have revealed the economic consequences caused by equity pledge of controlling shareholders,but few scholars have explored the relationship between equity pledge and cash holding value,as well as the regulating mechanism between them.In this paper,the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and cash holding value are put into the same research framework,and the influence of property rights and enterprise growth heterogeneity on the relationship is examined,and the mechanism of agency cost is further explored.It has certain theoretical and practical significance for enterprises to formulate reasonable cash management system,plan growth path and evaluate financing risk.This paper summarizes the existing literature and makes a theoretical analysis of the relationship between equity pledge and cash holding value of controlling shareholders based on relevant basic theories,and then puts forward four research hypotheses.Based on the proposed hypothesis,A multiple regression analysis model and A mediation effect test model were constructed respectively.Select the period 2010-2020,Shanghai and Shenzhen,29474 data of a-share listed companies as the research sample,to carry out the empirical test.The results show that the more the controlling shareholders pledge,the higher the pledge ratio,the lower the cash holding value of the enterprise.This negative impact is more significant in private enterprises;Higher growth to the controlling shareholder equity pledge a negative relationship with the value of cash holdings in ease.Agency cost plays a mediating role in the negative relationship between equity pledge and cash holding value of controlling shareholders.Compared with the previous research,the contribution of this paper mainly include the following: delving into the controlling shareholder equity pledge influence mechanism of the value of cash holdings,establishing reasonable moderate for listed companies cash management system to provide advice,expand the content about the cash asset management,divergent thinking for the existing research,provides the new way of thinking;It provides reference for enterprises to improve the system related to equity pledge of controlling shareholders,safeguard the overall interests of enterprises and promote the healthy development of the company;The analysis of the different consequences of different corporate equity pledge behaviors is helpful for enterprises to take appropriate and effective measures,formulate relevant policies,strengthen internal management,prevent and reduce risks to a certain extent,improve the level of corporate competition,and achieve higher cash value and market value. |
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